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I. INTRODUCTION
A vast amount of legal literature has addressed the problem of re-
strictive patent licensing under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty' and a sub-
I See P. DEMARET, PATENTS, TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS, AND EEC LAW (1978); B.
GUNZEL, TERRITORIALE BERSCHRANKTE LIZENZE BEI PARALLELEN PATENTEN IM GEMEIN-
SAMEN MARKT (1980); Alexander, La licence exclusive et les regles de concurrence de la CEE, 1973
C de D. 3; Alien, The Present Status of Exclusive Patent Licensing Agreements in Relation to the
Rules of Competition of the EEC, as Indicated by Four Recent Decisions of the EEC Commission, 19
ANTITRUST BULL. 81 (1974); Bonet, La commission des communautds europdenes et les accords de
concession de licence de brevets, 17 JURIS CLASSEUR PERIODIQUE 12067 (1976); Burst, L"Application
de L'Article 85 § 1 du Traite de Rome au Contrat de Licence de Brevet, L'INCIDENCE DU DROIT
COMMUNAUTAIRE DE LA CONCURRENCE SUR LES DROITS DE PROPRIftTf INDUSTRIELLE 107-17
(C.E.I.P.I. 1976); Burst and Kovar, Note, 1 ANNALES DE LA PROPRIfTf_ INDUSTRIELLE, ARTIS-
TIQUE ET LITTRAIRE 1-31 (1976); Cawthra, Patent License Agreements in the EC-Two New Deci-
sions of the Commission, 6 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 418 (1975); Cawthra,
Exclusive, Sole and Non-Exclusive Rights in Patent License Agreements, 7 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 430 (1977); Dashwood, Exclusive Licenses in the Common Market, 1973 J. Bus. L.
205; Ewing, Durchsetzung der Kartellgesetze and Patentsysteme: .4hnlichkeiten im europdischen und
amerikanischen Recht, 1980 GRUR. INT. 333 (1980); Hayward, Patent Licensing in the EEC, 35
Bus. LAW. 455 (1980); Holley, The Limits Placed by EEC Law on Territorial Protection in Patent
Licensing: A Case Study in Community Law-Making, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 561 (1981); Johan-
nes, Technology Transfer under EEC Law - Europe Between the Divergent Opinions of the Past and
the New Administration: A Comparative Law Approach, NINTH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 65 (1982); Korah, Exclusive Patent Licenses and Article
85, (1976) J. BUS. L. 66; Korah, Patents and Competition Law: Recent Decisions of the European
Commission, 1 EUR. L. REV. 185 (1976); Lew, Industrial Property Licensing and EEC Anti-Trust
Law, 17 Swiss REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW 27 (1983); Lieberknecht, Er-
sch 'pfung von Patentrechten and Exportverbote in Patentlizenzvertrdgen nach EWG Recht, 1975
FESTSCHRIFT MOHRING 467; Mailinder, Die kartellrechtliche Beurteilung von Lizenzvertr'gen nach
EG-Kartellrecht und US-Antitrustrecht, 1979 GRUR. INT. 378-393; Siragusa, Technology Transfers
under EEC Law: A Private View, NINTH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE
LAW INSTITUTE 95 (1982); Stumpf-Lindstaedt, Ausschliessliche Patentlizenzen und Exportverbote in
der Entscheidungspraxis der EG-Kommission, 1973 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 406; Theune, Die
Beurteilung ausschliesslicher Patentlizenzvertrdge nach Art 85 EWG-Vertrag, 1977 GRUR. INT. 63,
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stantial number of decisions illustrate the EC Commission's policy on
that patent-antitrust issue.2 In contrast, trademark licensing agreements
have hardly caught the attention of legal writers3 and the Campari case
of 1977 is the only decision that deals with them.4 Such paucity of case
law is surprising for two reasons. First, trademark licensing agreements
are fairly common business practice in sectors such as beer, soft drinks,
aperitifs, chocolate, cigarettes or clothing; and, second, several applica-
tions for exemption under Article 85(3) must have alerted the EC Com-
mission to other cases.5
Whereas only one EC Commission decision pertains to the legality
of restrictive trademark licensing, many judgments of the European
Court involve the relationship between the EEC Treaty rules on the free
movement of goods and national trademark laws.6 Regrettable as it may
111; Ullrich, Patentrechtsschutz ausschliesslicher Lizenznehmer gegen Direktlieferungen innerhalb des
Gemeinsamen Markt, 1973 GRUR. INT. 53; Ullrich, Ausschliessliche Patentlizenzen im gemeinsamen
Markt, 137 Z.H.R. 134 (1973); Ullrich, Intellectual Property in the EEC, in COMPETITION LAW IN
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE USA C.M.C-491 (D. Gijlstra ed. 1976); Zanon, Ties in patent licensing
Agreements, 5 EUR. L. REV. 391 (1980).
2 IMA AG v. Windsurfing Int'l Inc., 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229) 1, 39 Common Mkt.
L.R. 1 (1983); Vaessen BV v. Moris, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 19) 32, 24 Common Mkt. L.R. 511
(1979); AOIP v. Beyard, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 6) 8, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. D14 (1976);
Zuid-Nederlandsche Bronbemaling Grondboringen BV v. Heidemaatschappij Beheer NV, 18 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 249) 27, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. D67 (1975); Re Kabelmetal's Agreement, 18
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 34, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. D40 (1975); Re Raymond Co., 15 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 143) 39, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. D45 (1972); Re Davidson Co., 15 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 143) 31, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. D52 (1972); Burroughs-Delplanque and Burrough
Gehawerke, 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 50, 53, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. D67, D72 (1971).
3 Apart from Kinkeldey, Pitfall of Trademark Licensing in the EEC, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 145,
148 (1982) which is rather sketchy, I know of only U. LOEWENHEIM, WARENZEICHEN UND
WE'I-rBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNG (1970) which is about trademarks and trademark arrangements in
general. When dealing with specific restraints of trade, LOEWENHEIM fails to distinguish the various
contexts (e.g. licensing agreements or assignments inter alia to exclusive distributors) of the agree-
ments. Id. at 388-422.
4 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 397 (1978). More recently, the
EC Commission announced its intention to grant an exemption to the Carlsberg agreement. See
Carlsberg, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 27) 4, 39 Common Mkt. L.R. 305 (1984).
5 According to article 4 of Regulation 17/62, reprinted in 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962), the
parties to an agreement which falls within the ambit of article 85(1) must notify the EC Commission,
if they want that agreement to be granted a declaration of inapplicability according to article 85(3)
- a so-called exemption. This requirement of individual notification is waived only when a regula-
tion gives an exemption to a class of agreements, such as in the field of exclusive distributorship
agreements. See infra note 27.
6 See Pfizer Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 1981 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 2913, 33 Common Mkt.
L.R. 406; Centrafarm BV v. Amer. Home Prod. Corp., 1978 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1823, 24 Common
Mkt. L.R. 326; Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft, 1978 C.J. Comm.
E. Rec. 1139, 23 Common Mkt. L.R. 217; Terrapin (Overseas) Ltds. v. Terranova Industrie C.A.
Kepferer & Co., 1976 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1039, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. 482; E.M.I. Records Ltd. v.
C.B.S. United Kingdom Ltd., 1976 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 811, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. 235; Cen-
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be, there is still no body of supranational law applicable throughout the
Community, but only different national trademark laws whose scopes are
territorially limited.7 The coexistence of national trademark laws has
created obstacles to the free flow of trademarked products across na-
tional borders. Although some of those obstacles can be justified on the
basis of trademark law considerations, some cannot.8 In the absence of
trafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1183, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 480; Van
Zuylen Freres v. Hag A.G., 1974 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 731, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 127.
7 A proposal for a Regulation on the Community trademark has been presented by the Com-
mission to the Council on Nov. 25, 1980: 13 BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. (No. 5/80) (1980). This
draft regulation does not purport however to abolish national trademark laws. Owners of a Commu-
nity trademark will not be able to divide the Common Market by resorting to their trademark rights,
but business firms will remain free to choose to apply for a Community trademark. These firms may
seek instead the protection of national laws, and national trademarks owners will be in a position to
oppose the acquisition of a Community trademark by third parties. On the proposed system of the
Community trademark, see Entwicklungen und Grundziige des europdischen Markenrechts, 17
EUROPARECHT 30 (1982); Beier, Objectives and Guiding Principles of the Future European Trade-
mark Law, 8 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP & COPYRIGHT L. 1 (1977). By contrast, the Benelux Uni-
form Trademark Law, reprinted in 8 INDUS. PROP 307-13 (1969), contains provisions which are
designed to merge the three Benelux countries into a single unified territory for the application of
trademark law. After it went into effect (on Jan. 1, 1971), trademark rights could be acquired only
for the entire Benelux Group. The assignment of such rights for only part of the Benelux is deemed
void (article 11 (a)). Territorial restrictions in licenses are refused trademark law protection (article
11(b)). See infra note 51 and infra text accompanying notes 142-44. The principle of exhaustion
(see article 13(a) in fine and infra note 30) applies to products marketed by or with the consent of the
trademark owner. Owners of trademark rights which have been obtained before Jan. 1, 1971 under
the national laws of the Benelux countries (so-called vested rights) could retain those rights through
a new registration (article 30). Those rights extend automatically to the other Benelux countries,
unless they would conflict with independent rights held by third parties (article 32). If several own-
ers of such rights on an identical trademark are economically related, they cannot divide the Benelux
market by relying on their trademarks. On the Benelux system, see generally Demaret, Circulation
des produits et loi uniforme Benelux sur les marques, 8 REvuE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
EUROPEEN 523-557 (1972).
8 Properly understood, the principle of territoriality means only two things. See Beier, Territo-
riality of Trademark Law and International Trade, 1 INT'L INDUS. REV. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
48, 59 (1970):
(1) Trademark protection is determined by the national law of that country in which the
trademark owner seeks protection on the basis of registration or use. It is that particular na-
tional law which determines the requirements, the substance, and the extent of protection.
(2) The protection provided through a trademark granted by a given country, is limited to the
territory of that country: a domestic trademark cannot be infringed by foreign acts nor can
foreign trademarks be infringed by domestic acts. The area of protection and the place of iri-
fringement must coincide.
This often invoked principle does not imply that the trademark owner should always be able to
resort to trademark rights to repel products bearing the same or a similar trademark which have
been marketed first in a foreign country. No infringement remedy should be available, when the
trademark applied to the imported goods signifies the same source as that which it signifies to the
purchasing public on the domestic market, i.e., when the imported goods are genuine. The concept
of source must be construed broadly to include not only cases where the identical foreign and domes-
tic trademarks are owned and affixed by the same person, but also cases where the foreign trademark
is applied by a licensee of the domestic trademark owner, cases where the foreign and domestic
trademark owners are parent and subsidiary companies, and cases where an independent trademark
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any harmonization of laws pursuant to Article 100 of the EEC treaty,9
the European Court has had no available remedy - other than to resort
to the prohibition of measures with effects equivalent to quantitative re-
strictions - with which to counteract national statutes that grant in-
fringement remedies against parallel importers of genuine goods.' 0
This article will, of course, take those judgments into consideration
as it assesses the possibility for a trademark owner to confine its licensees
within national borders through infringement proceedings rather than
through contracts. But, Articles 30-36 of the EEC Treaty are directed at
restrictive measures adopted or supported by government action;"1 this
study's main concern is with collusive action by business firms which is
the target of Article 85. The case law that bears specifically upon the
application of Article 85 to trademark licensing agreements is indeed
very sparse; problems as basic as exclusive territorial licensing and terri-
has been assigned to an exclusive distributor for the duration of the exclusive distributorship
agreement.
9 It was not until Nov., 1980 that the EC Commission presented to the Council a Proposal for a
First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trademarks.
European Communities Commission, New Trademark System for the Community, to 13 BULL. EUR.
COMM. Supp. (No. 5/80) (1980). This draft directive is intended to harmonize national provisions of
trademark laws that influence most directly the free movement of goods and services. It provides
inter alia for the principle of exhaustion (article 6), including when trademarked products have first
been marketed abroad, and specifies the limitations in trademark licensing agreements that can be
enforced on the basis of trademark rights (article 7).
10 For a definition of genuine goods, see supra note 8. A parallel importer is an unauthorized
importer who buys the genuine goods from a foreign middleman to whom the goods have been sold
previously by the trademark owner, a related company or a licensee. By contrast, the expression
"direct imports" shall refer hereinafter to cases where the products have been directly sold by a
foreign licensee to an unofficial domestic importer.
11 In the Buy Irish Campaign case, Comm'n v. Ireland, 1982 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 4.005; 33
Common Mkt. L.R. 706 (1981), the EC Court would not have felt it necessary to stress that the
advertising campaign in favor of domestic products had been sponsored by the government and
financed by government funds, if the applicability of article 30-36 was not restricted to state meas-
ures. It is true that other cases are ambiguous to say the least. For instance, in Centrafarm BV v.
Winthrop BV, 1974 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1183, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 480, it is not clear whether
the EC Court held the measure of equivalent effect to lie in the national statute, id. at 2003, 14
Common Mkt. L.R. at 508 or in the judicial decision precluding the application of the exhaustion
principle, id. at 1999, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 502, or in the infringement action brought by the
private party, id. at 2003, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 508. See Joliet, Patented Articles and the Free
Movement of Goods within the ECC, 28 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 15, 24-28 (1975). In Terrapin
(Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industries CA Kapferer & Co., 1976 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1039, 1059,
18 Common Mkt. L.R. 482, 505 and in Hoffman-La Roche & Co. A.G. v. Centrafarm Vertrieb-
sgesellschaft, 1978 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1139, 1166, 23 Common Mkt. L.R. 217, 243, the EC Court
suggested that the applicability of the rules on the free movement of goods may depend on the
attitude taken by a private party. In Dansk Supermarked A/S v. Imerco A/S, 1981 C.J. Comm. E.
Rec. 181, 195, 32 Common Mkt. L.R. 590, 603, the EC Court went further, saying that "it is impos-
sible in any circumstances for agreements between individuals to derogate from the mandatory pro-
visions of the Treaty on the free movement of goods."
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torial sales restrictions remain largely unsettled. 12
Because the EC Commission and the European Court tend to look
at trademark arrangements with suspicion,13 the need for a systematic
study is even greater. Already, in their overzealous efforts to further a
simplistic gospel of a unified market, these institutions have strikingly
disregarded the proper function of the trademark and have unduly cur-
tailed the scope of national trademark laws." This attitude stems par-
12 For the meaning of the terms: "territorial license," "exclusive license," and "territorial sales
restrictions," see infra text accompanying notes 135-66.
13 In the Sirena case, Sirena s.r.l. v. Eda s.r.l., 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 69, 81, 10 Common
Mkt. L.R. 260, 2734, the EC Court held that article 85 applied to the assignment of a trademark to
an unrelated company, when the assignee relied upon the acquired trademark rights to repel the
import of products bearing the same trademark which had been marketed first by the assignor or one
of the licensees of the latter in another EEC country.
This case law makes it impossible for a trademark owner to sell his goodwill in one EEC coun-
try only. The EC Court and the EC Commission, compare the decision in Zwarte Kip, 17 O.J. Eur.
Comm. (No. L 237) 12, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. D79 (1974), with Penneys, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (no.
L 60) 19, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 100 (1978), apply the rules of competition, not to restore a compet-
itive situation, but, in order to establish a unified territory from the point of view of trademark law.
Cf article 11(a) of the Uniform Benelux Trademark Law which declares void assignments of a
trademark for part only of the Benelux territory. Instead of considering such assignments as void,
however, the European Court invites national courts not to grant the assignor (or the assignee) the
power to stop imports of goods marketed by the other party. As a result, goods bearing the same
trademark, but of different origin, can circulate freely in the same national territory.
It is improper to use article 85 to that end. An anticompetitive purpose may well underlie a
trademark assignment. See infra note 20. When there is no evidence that the trademark has been
assigned to further such a restrictive scheme, however, the assignment should be treated as a normal
business transaction. Despite the criticisms formulated by legal writers against that judgment, see,
e.g., Ladas, Cession des Marques et Legislation Antitrust, 88 PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE 216 (1972),
the EC Commission has applied the Sirena doctrine in Re Advocaat Zwarte Kip, 17 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 237) 12, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. D79 (1974). The EC Court seems, however, to have
qualified the Sirena doctrine in a later case. E.M.I. Records, Ltd. v. C.B.S. United Kingdom, Lt.,
1976 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 811, 848-9, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. 235, 267. There the Court suggested
that the applicability of article 85(1) depends on collusion elements other than the trademark assign-
ment itself.
14 See Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag A.G., 1974 C.J. Comm. E. Ree. 731, 14 Common Mkt. L.R.
127. Before World War II, the well-known German manufacturer of caffein-free coffee had assigned
its trademarks in Belgium and Luxemburg to a subsidiary. After World War II, the stock of this
subsidiary was seized as a result of a government decree on enemy properties and sold to a Belgian
firm, which in turn sold the trademark rights to another competing Belgian firm-Van Zuylen. In
the 1970, the German manufacturer attempted to regain the Belgian and Luxemburg markets while
using its old trademarks. Sued for infringement by the new trademark owner, Hag raised the EEC
rules on the free movement of goods as a defense and, surprisingly, prevailed before the EC Court,
on the ground that the trademarks in Germany and in Luxemburg had a common origin-a concept
completely alien to trademark law. This judgment has been rightly criticized by almost all legal
writers; see the numerous references cited by Waelbroeck, Examen de jurisprudence (1972-1982)-
Le droit economique de la C.E.E., 37 REVUE CRITIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE BELGE 261, 315
(1983).
Nevertheless, the European Court reaffirmed its position in Terrapin v. Terranova, 1976 C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 1039, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. 482, saying that free circulation should be enforced in
the situation described above, because the basic function of the trademark, the guarantee to consum-
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tially from their assumption that trademarks are inferior to patents.'"
Yet that approach overlooks the fact that trademarks are more indispen-
sable instruments of a market economy purporting to induce and reward
"superior skill, foresight and industry"' 6 than are patents. 17  But for
trademarks, which identify the best products and services, competition
on the merits would not be feasible. 18 To that extent, competition law
and trademark law do not conflict, but complement each other.1 9 This
does not mean, of course, that trademark arrangements have never
served to implement or buttress anticompetitive plans.2' But since trade-
ers that the product has the same origin, is already undermined by the subdivision of the original
right. I had in advance denounced this reasoning as specious in my remarks inActes du colloque de
l'Union des Fabricants, Paris, 1975 MARQUE ET DROIT ECONOMIQUE 124.
Is In theSirena case, 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 69, 10 Common Mkt. L.R. 260, the Advocate
General Dutheillet de Lamothe said in his opinion,
Both from the economic and from the human point of view the interests protected by patent
legislation merit greater respect than those protected by trademarks. . . From the human point
of view, the debt which society owes to the "inventor" of the name "Prep Good Morning" is
certainly not of the same nature, to say the least, as that which humanity owes to the discoverer
of penicillin.
The EC Court held in the Hag case, 1974 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 731, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 127,
"While in (a single market) the indication of origin of a product covered by a trademark is useful
information to consumers on this point may be ensured by means other than such as would affect the
free movement of goods."
This suggested explanation of the Court's attitude is no longer very convincing since in Merck
& Co., Inc. v. Stephar BV, 1981 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 2063, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. 463, the EC
Court deprived national patents as well of much of their substance. See, e.g., Korah, The Limitation
of Copyright and Patents by the Rules for the Free Movement of Goods in the European Common
Market, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 7, 28-34 (1982).
16 This is the formula used by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945), to describe "competition on the merits."
17 The rationale underlying the patent system is the incentive-by-monopoly theory. See, e.g.,
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SEss., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PAT-
ENT SYSTEM 21-24, (Comm. Print 1958) (Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
Study No. 15, prepared by Fritz Machlup). According to the marvelous formulation of Abraham
Lincoln, quoted in S. OPPENHEiM, G. WESTON AND J. MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS:
CASES AND COMMENTS 837, (4th ed. 1981), the patent system "adds the fuel of interest to the fire of
genius." See also supra SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, at 40 (quotation from J. Robinson),
"The justification of the patent system is that by slowing down the diffusion of technical progress it
insures [sic] that there will be more progress to diffuse."
18 Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trademarks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 173, 180 (1949), eloquently expressed that view:
The whole idea of free enterprise, as we understand it in this country, is based on the impor-
tance of identity and personal responsibility of the producer for the goods he sells, which are
evidenced by his trade-marks, names, and brands. If that is the sort of an economy we are to
have in this country-and I sincerely hope it is, because we have had it for a good many years
and it has worked-then trade-marks and brands should be protected so that an incentive will
be given to all manufacturers to produce the best goods they know how and take pride in
them-and not merely comply with minimum government specifications. You can't have com-
petition unless you can distinguish the competing goods and choose between them. Trade-
marks make this distinction and this choice possible. Without them there could be none.
19 See Handler, Trademarks and Antitrust Laws, 38 TRADE-MARK REP. 387 (1948).
20 Often exclusive distributors have been assigned (or authorized to register) the trademark,
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mark law is an instrument of competition and trademark licensing is
merely, as the direct exploitation of a trademark by its owner, another
way of using a trademark,2 1 trademark licensing agreements themselves
should not be challenged.22 The true and difficult problem-which this
study attempts to tackle-lies with drawing a line between the accompa-
nying restrictive clauses that should be allowed to stand and those that
should be struck down.
This inquiry focuses only on product trademark licenses. It does
not consider franchise agreements in the technical sense of the term,
23
that is, those agreements that grant a license to carry on business and to
offer a service under a franchisor's tradename and service trademark.24
The reason for this limited focus is neither that some European
countries protect service trademarks with laws against unfair trade prac-
tices instead of trademark laws 25 nor that the only EEC precedent - the
which a manufacturer held in their allocated territories, so that they could claim trademark or cus-
toms law protection against the competition of unauthorized importers. See Grundig/Consten case,
1966 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 299, 5 Common Mkt. L.R. 418; United States v. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y., 1957) and the comments in Bicks, Antitrust and Trademark Protection Concept in the
Import Field, 49 TRADE-MARK REP. 1255 (1959), by Handler, Trademarks-Assets or Liabilities? 48
TRADE-MARK REP. 661 (1958), in Note, 71 HARV. L. REV. 564-568 (1958) and infra note 206.
Also, cross-assignments of trademarks have been effectuated in order to implement a world-wide
division of markets as in United States v. American Tobacco, 221 U.S. 106, 172 (1911). For a
description of the trademark situation, see the British MONOPOLIES COMMISSION REPORT ON THE
SUPPLY OF CIGARETTE AND TOBACCO MACHINERY, 34-35 (July 4, 1961).
21 The Benelux Uniform Trademark Law which sanctions the non-use of a trademark through
its extinction (Article 5(34) considers the use by the licensee to be equivalent to the use by the
licensor.
22 But see Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Law in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J.
1171, 1191 (1963) which points out that "trademark licensing, by encouraging actual and potential
competitors to become licensees, may not only impede research and innovation but may also reduce
the very competition which trademarks are intended to promote."
23 In the United States, the expression "franchise agreements" is also used to designate exclusive
distributorship agreements, i.e., types of arrangements which do not imply a true license. See, e.g.,
White Motor v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 267 (1963) (J. Brennan concurring); United States v.
Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 371 (1967) and L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST 423-424 (1976).
24 See, e.g., Adams, Franchising and Antitrust in the United Kingdom and European Commu-
nity, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 815, 817 (1981); AZEMA, 1981 DROIT DE LA CONCURRENCE 184; Wil-
liams, Trademarks and Related Rights in Franchise Agreements in Germany: A Comparison with
U.S. Law, 14 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 629 (1983).
25 This is the case in the Benelux countries where the Benelux Uniform Trademark Law only
covers products; a protocol signed on Mar. 15, 1983, but not yet ratified, will however extend the
scope of the statute to service trademarks. See 1984 REVUE DE DROIT INTELLECTUEL 84. So far,
the protection of service trademarks in Belgium is identical to that of trade names. See E. ULMER,
C. SCHRICKER & B. FRANCQ, 2 LA REPRESSION DE LA CONCURRENCE DELOYALE DANS LES
ETATS MEMBERS DE LA C.E.E. 280-291 (1974). By contrast, the German Trademark Law of 1968,
as it has been last amended in 1979 (see Article 1 § 2) and the French Trademark Law of 1964 also
apply to service trademarks.
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Campari decision - involves a product trademark licensing system.
Rather, from the point of view of competition law, product trademark
licenses raise somewhat different problems than franchise agreements.
These differences are obvious, for instance, with regard to territorial re-
strictions. The services of restaurants, hotels, dance schools, and rent-a-
car companies are almost inherently local. In contrast, firms which are
authorized to use trademarks in connection with manufactured products
normally ship those products in wide areas. The problems are also differ-
ent with respect to restrictions on advertising. In the case of a service,
restrictions regarding decor and design ensure the identity of the service
offered - they maintain quality control.26 The same justification cannot
be put forward to support restrictions on the nature and style of product
advertising.
Also, product trademark licensing agreements must be distinguished
from distributorship agreements. This distinction is important for two
reasons. First, parties to exclusive distributorship agreements can benefit
from the group exemption granted by Regulation 1983/83.27 In con-
trast, parties who want to ensure their ability to enforce restrictive provi-
sions in trademark licensing agreements may have to secure individual
exemptions under Article 85(3).28 Second, some argue that bans on di-
rect exports by licensees outside the licensed territory are beyond the
reach of Article 85(1). Such bans, it is said, merely restate the protection
inherent in national trademark laws, because the domestic trademark
26 See infra note 86.
27 Regulation of the EC Commission of June 22, 1983, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (no. L 173) 1
(1983), which has replaced the Regulation no. 67/67 of the EC Commission of Mar. 22, 1967, 10
J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 57) 849 (1967).
28 Under the doctrine of the second Brasserie de Haecht case, Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin,
1973 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 77, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 287, national courts must give full effect to
restrictive agreements concluded before the entry into effect of Regulation no. 17/62, which have
been duly notified, pending the Commission's decision on the grant or refusal of an exemption. See
also Ets. A. de Bloos Spol v. Bouyer SCA, 1977 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 2359, 21 Common Mkt. L.R.
511. By contrast, for agreements concluded after Regulation no. 17/62 came into effect, according
to the second Brasserie de Haecht case, supra, the notification does not render duly notified restric-
tive agreements automatically enforceable. An agreement which, in the light of the Commission's
previous case law, does not appear likely to be exempted, must surely be treated as illegal. But the
reverse is less certain. In my view, the EC Court did not decide whether the national judge could
enforce a restrictive agreement which had not yet been exempted by the EC Commission but which
was highly likely to be exempted. The EC Commission, however, has submitted that the European
Court actually had so ruled. See De Norre v. NV Brouwerij Concordia, 1977 C.J. Comm. E. Rec.
65, 89, 19 Common Mkt. L.R. 378, 398; Procureur de la Republique v. Giry and Guerlain SA, 1980
C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 2327, 2369, 31 Common Mkt. L.R. 99, 130.
Assuming that the European Court should endorse that position, the use of preliminary letters
announced by the EC Commission, see 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 295) 6 (1983), will enable
national judges to predict the chances which an agreement has to obtain a formal exemption.
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owner would be entitled to invoke its trademark right to stop resale of
products directly supplied by its foreign licensee.29 In the case of territo-
rial resale restrictions inserted in exclusive distributorship agreements,
this argument need not be discussed. The exhaustion principle provides
that the circulation of a trademarked product that has been sold by the
trademark owner, for instance to a distributor, is thereafter free of trade-
mark law restraints.3 °
In the Nungesser case, the EC Court did not perceive the basic dif-
ference between a distributorship agreement and a licensing agreement.
As a result, it inadequately transferred 31 to licenses a distinction between
open and closed agreements which it had originally devised for exclusive
distributorship agreements.32 The Court apparently equated a licensor's
promise not to compete with the licensees with the manufacturer's prom-
ise not directly to supply any other distributor in a designated area. It
wrongly concluded that unlike territorial sales restrictions imposed upon
licensees, the licensor's promise not to compete does not necessarily re-
strict competition in violation of Article 85(1).
3 1
A clear definition of trademark licenses is even more necessary, be-
cause both business executives and lawyers use the word "license" indis-
criminately and conclude agreements they call "licenses" when no
license is really necessary. 34 A trademark license has been properly de-
fined as "a contractual arrangement whereby a trademark owner permits
another to use his trademark where, but for the license, the other would
be a trademark infringer."35 More specifically, by granting a license the
owner promises not to sue another business for trademark infringement if
that business affixes the trademark upon and sells products which it itself
has manufactured, assembled, processed or in some way completed.36
29 See, e.g., J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, 2 ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 63
(2d ed. 1981) which discusses the argument without endorsing it.
30 See article 13(a) infine of the Uniform Benelux Trademark Law which provides: "Neverthe-
less, the exclusive right to the trademark does not imply the right to oppose the use of that trade-
mark for products which the owner or his licensee have marketed under that trademark, unless the
state of the products has been altered." [Author's translation]. A similar principle applies under the
German trademark law. See Decision of Feb. 28, 1902, 50 RGZ 229 Kolnisch Wasser.
31 Nungesser v. Comm'n, 1982 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 2015, 36 Common Mkt. L.R. 278.
32 See Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export SA, 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 949, 959, 11
Common Mkt. L.R. 81, 95-96; Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm G.m.b.H., 1966 C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 235, 249, 5 Common Mkt. L.R. 357, 375; Joliet, Faut-il gu'une concession de vente
exclusive soit ouverte ou fermie? Riflexions d propos de l'arrt Cadillon de la Cour de Justice des
Communautes Europdenes, 7 REvUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN 814 (1971).
33 See infra text accompanying notes 189-94.
34 See J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 6-3 (1984).
35 Id.
36 Id. at § 6-3 and § 6-4.
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Any business that merely resells the finished trademarked product in the
same condition as when it obtained it from the trademark holder serves
only as a distributor; the exemption of Regulation 1993/83 may apply to
such an agreement. In contrast, any business that buys a syrup from the
trademark owner, makes it into a soft drink by adding carbonated water,
and bottles or cans it before selling it must obtain express authorization
from the trademark owner, i.e., a true license. Thus, the well-known
agreements between United States syrup manufacturing companies, such
as the Coca-Cola Company and independent bottlers exemplify trade-
mark licenses.37 There are, however, borderline cases. Should an im-
porter, who buys beer in large containers from a foreign brewery and
resells it after bottling or canning it, be categorized as a distributor or as
a licensee? If the finished product is bottled or canned beer ready for sale
to consumers, rather than beer itself, the trademark owner's permission
is required, because bottling or canning is a completion operation.38
II. THE SEARCH FOR A TEST OF LEGALITY
It is a natural tendency to seek a rule of thumb by which to distin-
guish lawful from unlawful restraints. If such a rule could be devised, it
37 Cf the EC Commission notice of Dec. 30, 1983 concerning Regulations no. 1983/83 and no.
1984/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 355) (1983). The Commission explains that an exclusive
distributorship agreement within the meaning of article 1 of Regulation no. 1983/83 requires an
"economic identity" between the products supplied to the distributor and the products resold by
him. According to the EC Commission, "the economic identity of the goods is not affected if the
reseller merely breaks up and packs the goods into other packages before resale." "Where the re-
seller performs additional operations to improve the quality, durability, appearance or taste of the
goods, the position will depend mainly on how much value the operation adds to the goods". The
EC Commission will apply this test, it says, to "agreements under which the reseller is supplied with
a concentrated extract for a drink which he has to dilute with water. . . and to bottle before resel-
ling". It does not indicate, however, to which result this test leads in such cases; it is probable that
the added value is very high and that consequently Regulation no. 1983/83 does not come into play.
Since the test propounded by the EC Commission is economic in nature, it may well be that an
agreement which imposes certain additional operations upon the so-called distributor can benefit
from Regulation no. 1983/83, although it is a trademark licensing agreement in the legal sense
which is given here. I have doubts, however, whether this economic test is in accordance with the
statutory language. Article 1 of Regulation no. 1983/83 seems to require the distributor to sell
products which are in the same condition as obtained from the manufacturer.
38 In the United States, a business, which buys a product in bulk and bottles it, may use the
trademark to indicate it is selling the genuine product. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359
(1924). The rule seems to be different under the law of most EEC countries: rebottling or repacking
by an unauthorized third party can be restrained on the basis of trademark rights. See generally,
Beier, The Doctrine of Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law-Scope and Limits 10 INT'L REV. IN-
DUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 20-51 (1979), and for the Benelux law, see Deliege-Sequaris, La Protec-
tion de la Marque Selon l'Article 13 A de la Loi Benelux, 1979 REVUE DE DROIT INTELLECTUEL
179, 219-220. It would seem that a fortiori using a protected trademark for the first bottling or
packaging falls within the exclusive prerogative of the trademark owner.
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would certainly make it easier to administer and to predict the law. But
with regard to trademark licensing, the search is futile.
It is true that writers on either side of the Atlantic and courts in the
United States have formulated a variety of justifications to support re-
strictive provisions in trademark licensing agreements: the ancillary re-
straints of trade theory, the inherent restrictions theory and the statutory
duty theory. Whatever merits the theories may have in some instances,
none serve as adequate tools by which to sort out the restrictions typi-
cally used in trademark licenses. In the first place, no theory addresses
all restrictions. Secondly, all the theories together would still support
antitrust immunity for very few restrictions. This is not to say, however,
that all other restrictions should be found illegal; their legality should
depend on their actual impact on competition.
A. The Ancillary Restraints of Trade Theory
Take the ancillary restraints of trade theory as an example. Accord-
ing to Judge Taft's classical formulation, a conventional restraint is legal
when "the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose
of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the en-
joyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from
the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party."39 The
word "ancillary" seems to imply that without such a restriction the aim
of the transaction would be frustrated.' For instance, if it were unlawful
to impose upon a "licensee" a duty not to disclose a secret, know-how
agreements would never be concluded. Such a view of the ancillary re-
straint of trade theory could justify almost no restriction in trademark
licensing agreements apart from provisions relating to manufacturing
standards.4 1
It seems especially mistaken to uphold territorial sales restrictions as
being merely ancillary to a licensing system: they can never be ancillary
in the narrow sense.42 The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) decision
39 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (7th Cir. 1898). On the ancillary
restraints of trade theory, see Bork,Ancillary Restraints and the ShermanAct, 15 A.B.A. SEC. ANTI-
TRUST REP. 211 (1959).
40 The EC Commission's reasoning inReuter v. BASFA. G., 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 254) 40,
12 Common Mkt. L.R. D44 (1976), § 42 at D56, exemplifies a narrow view of the ancillary restraints
of trade theory and, therefore, needs approval.
41 Without such agreed means of ensuring product uniformity and quality, trademark owners
would not be ready to enter into licensing agreements. It is obvious that their goodwill would suffer
from the sale of inferior quality products by the licensees. See infra at text accompanying notes 77-
79.
42 But see Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 409 (5th Cir. 1962). Also,
the antitrust division of the United States Department of Justice endorsed a broader understanding
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in In re Coca-Cola has convincingly demonstrated that the requirement
of quality control, which is necessary to protect the trademark owner
from being held responsible by the public for marketing inferior prod-
ucts, cannot justify such territorial restrictions.4 3 The Coca-Cola Com-
pany argued that its system of territorial sales restrictions promoted
quality control in two ways. First, bottlers with licenses for restricted
geographic areas cannot afford to risk losing clients dissatisfied with
product quality. Thus, the restrictions induce bottlers to manufacture
high quality products." The FTC sensibly replied that "at the manufac-
turing level, . . . unscheduled inspections and frequent product sam-
pling, coupled with the threat of termination, . . . should provide a
strong deterrent to the bottler who might be inclined to cheat on quality,
notwithstanding the markets in which he may ultimately distribute the
finished products."4 5 Secondly, the system enables licensors to monitor
the quality of each bottler's products at the retail level.4 6 To rebut that
assertion, the FTC rightly pointed out that
a supplier of a trademarked product may have available to it means less
anticompetitive than territorial. . restrictions to ensure a reasonable mea-
sure of quality control at each level in the chain of distribution. Respon-
dents may . . . establish reasonable quality control standards for
distribution and storage, including inventory rotations policies and may
further require that each bottler identify itself on the bottle, bottle cap or on
the can so that respondents may reasonably monitor compliance with its
quality standards. Clearly, quality control and intrabrand competition are
not incompatible.47
B. The Inherent Restrictions Theory
The inherent restrictions theory is another theory used to justify re-
strictive provisions. It looks to the nature of the available remedy in case
of licensee non-compliance for its decisive test of legality. Thus it places
particular significance on whether a licensee who violates particular re-
strictive provisions becomes subject to infringement actions, rather than
to mere contractual remedies. 4' This theory's proponents argue that, be-
of the word "ancillary" in its ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 3 (1977):
"Terms of an agreement may be permitted, despite the fact that they restrict some competition,
provided that the restriction is clearly ancillary to some legitimate purpose and is appropriately
limited in scope." [Emphasis supplied by the author].
43 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978).
44 Id. at 632.
45 Id. at 633.
46 Id. at 632.
47 Id. at 634-5.
48 In the United States, the concept of "inherent" restriction is used in patent law, but not in
trademark law. Even in patent law, it is not clear that it has the same meaning as that given here.
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cause Article 85 requires a contractual element, those restrictions that
fall within the scope of the trademark lie beyond the Article's reach.
This theory has raised an objection. As long as the availability of
infringement remedies may vary according to the national laws of indi-
vidual EEC Member States, acceptance of such a theory would interfere
with uniform application of Article 85." By itself, this objection is not
decisive. If the scope of the trademark rights differs from country to
country, the proper remedy lies in the harmonization of national laws
pursuant to Article 100 of the EEC Treaty. 0
The inherent restriction theory is well-founded. Nevertheless, it is
unsatisfactory for two reasons; it is both unhelpful and misleading.
It is unhelpful because licensors rarely can enforce restrictions sim-
ply on the basis of trademark rights. 1 Since the national laws of many
EEC countries provide for enforcement of such provisions by contractual
remedies only,52 that theory would fail, for example, to justify manufac-
turing specifications.
The theory is misleading because the fact that the licensor, by virtue
of trademark rights, has the power to stop a licensee from taking steps
not covered by the license does not imply that contractual restrictions
For example, in United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489-490, (1926), the Supreme
Court, dealing with a minimum price restriction in a license agreement and its antitrust legality,
stated that the patentee "may grant a license to make, use and vend articles under the specification of
his patent. . . upon any conditions the performance of which is reasonably within the reward which
the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to receive".
The Court did not imply that the violation of such restriction made the licensee liable to patent
infringement proceedings. By contrast, in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305
U.S. 124, 127 (1983), which concerned only patent law, the Supreme Court used, in connection with
a field-of-use restriction, the same idea as that conveyed by the "inherent" restriction conception:
as the restriction was legal and amplifiers were made and sold outside the scope of the license,
the effect is precisely the same as if no license whatsoever had been appointed to Transformer
Company. And as Pictures Corporation knew the facts, it is in no better position than if it had
manufactured the amplifiers itself without a license. It is liable because it has used the invention
without license to do it.
49 See Johannes, La Proprijti Industrielle et le Droit d'Auteur dans le Droit des CE., 9 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN 367, 378-379 (1973).
50 See article 6 and article 7 of the proposal for a first Council Directive to approximate the laws
of the Member States relating to trademarks, European Communities Commission, supra note 9, at
10.
51 See article 11 of the Benelux Uniform Trademark Law, which provides: "any restriction of
the license other than an to duration or as to part of the products for which the trademark has been
registered shall be without effect as regards the application of the present statute" [Author's
translation].
52 This is at least the case under the Benelux Uniform Trademark Law. See the translation of
article 11, supra note 51. By contrast, article 7 of the proposal for a first Council Directive to
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trademarks, supra note 9 at 7, provides that
the licensee who does not comply with the manufacturing standards specified by the trademark
owner is liable to a trademark infringement action.
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that have the same effect should escape the prohibition of Article 85. For
example, the theory implies that territorial licensing, i.e., granting a li-
cense to one firm in each Member State, should be free of illegality--even
if a licensor confines each licensee within national borders by resorting to
infringement remedies.13 But normal antitrust scrutiny applies to territo-
rial sales restrictions.54
C. The Statutory Duty Theory
A third theory is conceivable - the statutory duty theory. First,
certain national trademark laws may make some restrictions, such as
those designed to ensure quality control, mandatory." Article 85 can-
not, of course, penalize private parties for drafting their contracts accord-
ingly. Second, a general law of contracts may supplement explicit
contractual provisions. For example, it may prohibit assignment of the
license unless parties stipulate otherwise - which they may do.56 If par-
ties were to insert such a prohibition in their agreement, application of
Article 85 would result in invalidating the licensing agreement.5 Such a
provision would not be severable from the remainder of the agreement -
which should in any event have been construed as implying the same
promise.
Again, however useful that theory may be, it can legalize only very
few restrictions.
D. Distinction Between The Existence And The Exercise of
Trademark Rights
The European Court has drawn a distinction between the existence
of industrial property rights, which Community law must respect, and
the exercise of those rights which Community law can curtail. Unfortu-
nately, that well-known and often repeated distinction offers no better
guidance.
The European Court originally conceived of such a distinction in its
53 See infra text accompanying notes 147-56.
54 See infra text accompanying notes 160-66.
55 See, e.g., the U.K. law and the U.S. Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982). On the U.K. law
relating to "registered user agreements," see W. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 556-556 (1981). On the United States law, see J.
GILSON, supra note 34, at 6-8 and Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark
Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 (1963).
56 For patent licensing agreements, see Joliet, Le contrat de licence de brevet en droit civil francais
et beige, 1982 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL ET ECONOMIQUE 167, 197-198
(1982) and the references cited therein.
57 See Joliet, supra note 56 at 169-170.
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Grundig-Consten opinion.58 In that case, a German manufacturer of
trademarked products appointed a different exclusive distributor for each
EEC country. The German manufacturer prohibited both the German
wholesalers and the exclusive distributors from exporting or reexporting
Grundig products, either directly or indirectly. A trademark arrange-
ment served to buttress the contractual restrictions. Grundig affixed two
trademarks on its products, Grundig and Gint. The manufacturer re-
tained the ownership of Grundig for itself while enabling exclusive dis-
tributors to register the Gint trademark as their own. It set up this
arrangement merely to provide exclusive distributors with trademark re-
lief against parallel imports of genuine goods - a practice erroneously
considered a trademark infringement.5 9
The EC Commission, endorsed by the European Court, struck down
this contractual system of tight territorial confinement. But, instead of
attacking the trademark arrangement itself and ordering the exclusive
distributors to drop the registration of the trademark Gint, the Commis-
sion enjoined the French exclusive distributor from bringing infringe-
ment actions against parallel importers.' The parties challenged the
order on the theory that the EEC Treaty does not grant jurisdiction to
European institutions to interfere with national industrial property
rights. The European Court, however, rejected that submission and
stated that
the injunction contained in Article 3 of the operative part of the contested
decision to refrain from using rights under national trademark law in order
to set an obstacle in the way of parallel imports does not affect thegrant of
these rights but only limits their exercise for the extent necessary to give
effect to the prohibition under Article 85 (1).61
The European Court probably meant that Community law could not
void the registration itself, because only national laws may determine the
grounds for nullity. This conclusion is admittedly well-founded, but it
does not follow that the EC Commission could limit the use of infringe-
ment remedies. A challenge to the agreement itself and an order to the
exclusive distributor either to withdraw the registration or to transfer it
58 Consten and Grundig v. E.E.C. Comm'n, 1966 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 299, 5 Common Mkt.
L.R. 418.
59 The parallel import of genuine goods cannot in my view be considered as a trademark in-
fringement. See supra note 8. The issue was never decided by the French Court in the Consten-
Grundig case, 1966 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 299, 5 Common Mkt. L.R. 418, since the EC Commission
ordered Grundig and its exclusive distributor to stop the trademark infringement proceedings.
60 Re Grundig's Agreement, 7 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 161) 2545, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 489
(1964).
61 Consten and Grundig v. E.E.C. Comm'n, 1966 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 299, 5 Common Mkt.
L.R. 418 (emphasis added).
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to Grundig would have been more appropriate.62
In endorsing the restriction on the use of the infringement remedy
itself, the Court's opinion is at the root of much confusion between the
scope of the rules on the free movement of goods and that of Article 85.
Article 85 aims only at collusive business firm behavior. It catches the
agreement which has enabled the exclusive distributor to invoke trade-
mark relief. It does not, however, reach the use of infringement remedy
which, by hypothesis, is unilateral. On the one hand, if there is an agree-
ment permitting the exclusive distributor to register one of the manufac-
turer's trademarks as its own, an infringement remedy can be used to
block competition from parallel importers only if there is an implicit or
statutory rule to support it. On the other hand, in the absence of such an
agreement, trademark protection could still be used to repel parallel im-
ports if applicable national law were to give the manufacturer a right to
sue parallel importers for infringement. Thus, only by attacking national
law itself can EC institutions eradicate the resulting obstacle to competi-
tion. The Treaty prohibition of measures equivalent to quantitative re-
strictions which is directed at state measures provides them with the
proper instrument to that end.
It is this remedy to which later cases have resorted. The Court re-
placed the phrase "grant of exclusive rights" with the words "existence
of exclusive rights".63 It has used the distinction to justify limitations by
the EEC rules regarding the free movement of goods on the application
of national laws. But the distinction between the existence and the exer-
cise of a right has little meaning. Obviously, a right only exists in more
than theory if it can be exercised." The safeguard of the specific subject
matter of the industrial property right at stake is a more meaningful and
objective test." When, without regard for whether infringement reme-
62 Cf the United States Omega Watch case in which the U.S. government had alleged that the
Swiss manufacturer and its American distributor had agreed to work cooperatively to prevent unau-
thorized imports into and re-exports from the United States. The government obtained a consent
decree which enjoined the manufacturer from assigning its United States trademark to its distributor
for the purpose of facilitating import relief actions, except in connection with a bona fide sale of the
assets and business of the manufacturer. See United State v. Norman M. Morris Corp., 1976-1
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 68,880, 68,882; see also Competitive Impact Statement, 41 Fed. Reg. 5360,
5363 (1976).
63 See supra note 6.
64 See Korah, Dividing the Common Market through National Industrial Property Rights, 1972
MOD. L. REV. 634, 636; Loewenheim, Trademarks and Free Competition within the European Com-
munity, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 727, 736 (1976).
65 By specific subject matter of the trademark, the European Court apparently means the prerog-
atives which must absolutely be given to the trademark owner so that the trademark can accomplish
its function. See Joliet, Patented Articles and the Free Movement of Goods within the EEC, 28
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 15, 29 (1975).
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dies are necessary to safeguard the particular subject-matter of an indus-
trial property right, national laws permit infringement remedies against
those who import into one EEC country products which were first mar-
keted in another EEC country, those national laws conflict with the EEC
rules protecting the free movement of goods. To that extent, national
courts must disregard them and withhold the infringement remedy.
Clearly, the Court introduced the tests of the existence of a right or
of the need to safeguard the specific subject-matter of a right only in
relation with the proper use or grant of infringement remedies. The
problem has been to oppose private party use of infringement remedies
or, more precisely, national trademark statute grants of such remedies.
This is not, however, the problem presented by restrictive provisions
in trademark licensing agreements. True, the EC Commission explains
at times that a particular provision guarantees the existence of the exclu-
sive right66 or safeguards its specific subject matter.67 The Commission
probably means that the restrictive provision under review is necessary to
protect the function of the industrial property right. This formulation
would be more appropriate. The need to protect the trademark function
is not, however, a test which can be applied in all cases. It fails to justify
restrictive provisions - like exclusive licenses, territorial sales restric-
tions or licensee promises not to manufacture or sell competing products
- which clearly have great practical importance. The failure of the pro-
posed justification, however, does not mean that the restrictions should
be held anticompetitive.
E. The Rule of Reason Analysis
In sum, only a full Rule of Reason analysis establishes a standard by
which to appraise most restrictions found in trademark licensing agree-
ments. The EC Commission should look beyond the restriction upon the
parties' freedom of behavior to the "impact upon competitive condi-
tions.",68 It should determine the reasons for the restriction "because
knowledge of intent may help the Court to interpret facts and predict
66 See Campari, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69, 75, 23 Common Mkt. L.R. 397, 407 (1978).
See also infra at 17.
67 See, e.g., Windsurfing International, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 228) 10, 11-12, 39 Common
Mkt. L.R. 1 (1983); Bomberault v. Eisele and Inra, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 286) 31, 23 Com-
mon Mkt. L.R. 450-451, on the exclusive license and non-competition clause.
68 Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978) (J. Stevens). In
my view, Justice Stevens' opinion, Id. at 687-692, provides the best restatement of the rule of reason.
This opinion definitely quieted the often made assertion (especially by European writers, see Van
Houtte, A Standard of Reason in EEC Antitrust Law: Some Comments on the Application of Parts I
and 3 ofArticle 85, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 497, 498, 498 n.8 (1982)), that the Rule of Reason can
justify anticompetitive agreements in the name of expediency.
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consequences." 69 Although an agreement regulates and restricts the par-
ties' market behavior, it may in fact promote competition.7 ° For exam-
ple, vertical restrictions which reduce intrabrand competition may
enhance interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve
certain efficiencies in product distribution." The Rule of Reason analy-
sis requires a balancing of intrabrand and interbrand competitive effects.
Of course, "litigation of the effect or purpose of a practice is often exten-
sive and complex. . .[a]nd the result of the process in any given case
may provide little certainty or guidance about the legality of a practice in
another context ... 72 But the alternative, a mechanical test such as
whether an agreement restricts the parties' freedom of trade, involves the
far worse risk of ignoring or distorting underlying economic realities.
III. REVIEW OF RESTRICTIVE PROVISIONS IN TRADEMARK
LICENSING AGREEMENTS
A. Restrictions Relating to Products Manufactured under a License
Trademark licensing agreements usually specify the products they
embrace and prescribe the manufacturing methods.
1. Product Specification
One particular trademark may enjoy protection with regard to a
range of different products. Clearly, the owner must remain free to li-
cense that trademark for some products and not for others. Some com-
mentators have compared this type of limitation with field of use
restrictions in patent licenses. 73 This analogy, however, is inadequate.
Field of use restrictions in patent licensing may be designed to segregate
different categories of purchasers of the same product.74 A similar pur-
69 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
70 Id.
71 See Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977). The Supreme Court offered
little guidance about the process for a rule of reason analysis. Hence, the views presented by legal
writers conflict. Compare, e.g., Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical
Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1-38 (1978) with Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic
Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1-20 (1977). An excellent model
of the rule of reason analysis was presented after Sylvania. Zelek, Stern & Dunfee,A Rule ofReason
Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CAL. L. REV. 13 (1980).
72 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (J. Stevens).
73 See Kinkeldey, Pitfall of Trademark Licensing in the EEC, 72 TRADE-MARK REP. 145, 148
(1982).
74 See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 554 (1977); General Talking
Pictures v. Western Elec., 305 U.S. 124 (1938) in which one company had been licensed to manufac-
ture and sell amplifiers for use in theaters but another company had been licensed to manufacture
and sell amplifiers for the home field.
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pose does not explain trademark product specification. By definition, the
products encompassed in the license differ from those left out.
The Uniform Benelux Law confers trademark protection upon
product limitations and upon license duration limitations.75 As a conse-
quence, licensees who use a trademark for products not covered by their
agreements are subject to trademark infringement actions. Product spec-
ification implies only that a licensor promises not to sue the licensee for
using the trademark for listed products. Since licensors can ensure com-
pliance by relying on trademark rights, they need not exact promises
from licensees not to produce goods not covered by the license. Thus,
such a limitation is not contractual and remains outside the scope of Ar-
ticle 85(1).76
2. Restrictions on How Licensees Manufacture or Process the Products
Covered by the License.
a. Manufacturing Standards
Trademark licensing agreements almost always include manufactur-
ing standards. In addition, they usually stipulate the licensor's right to
examine samples of the products and to inspect the licensee's manufac-
turing facilities. Such provisions certainly interfere with the licensee's
freedom of behavior and restrain trade. But were it not for an agreed
means of ensuring uniformity and quality of the product, trademark
owners would never license their trademarks at all. Thus, these provi-
sions are merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract. They
fall outside the prohibition of Article 85(1).
The trademark owner's need, or even duty, to exercise quality con-
trol stems directly from the trademark function. United States writers
have pointed out that the trademark function has developed from that of
indicating origin, the so-called "source" theory, to that of guaranteeing
quality.7 7 This holds equally true under the Uniform Benelux Trade-
mark Law. That characterization of the trademark function means that
"the consumer assumes that products sold under the trademark will be of
equal quality regardless of the actual producer of the goods," not neces-
sarily expecting "high quality, but merely equal quality, whether that
75 See article 11 translated supra note 51.
76 Cf Kinkeldey, supra note 73 at 148, who reaches the same conclusion but on the basis of the
fallacious (in my view) analogy with field-of-use restrictions in patent licensing agreements.
77 See McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 CAL. L.
REV. 1085, 1111-1112 (1970); Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 813 (1927); Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE
L.J. 1171, 1174-1178 (1963).
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quality is high, low or mediocre". 78 As the United States Assistant Com-
missioner of Patents ably stated, the trademark "fixes responsibility [for
quality] by indicating the source of the article bearing it."
79
The drafters of the Uniform Benelux Trademark Law have defined
that responsible source as "the center from which production is di-
rected."80 From such a perspective, the concept of source may encom-
pass more than simply the trademark owner. It also includes other
businesses whenever the trademark owner is able to exercise sufficient
control over the nature and quality of their products.8" Since the trade-
mark agreement enables the owner to impose quality specifications upon
licensees, the public may hold the licensor responsible for the quality of
the licensees' products. Licensors who fail to maintain quality control
cannot complain if their goodwill, i.e. their expectancy of custom,82 suf-
fers from the licensees' having sold inferior quality products. Thus,
although the Uniform Benelux Law does not impose such a duty, the
licensor in fact has a vital interest in providing for and exercising ade-
quate quality control.
It is by drawing logical inferences from this definition of source that
the Uniform Benelux Trademark Law has determined the scope of the
rule of exhaustion. According to Article 13A, trademark owners cannot,
simply by virtue of trademark rights, control the circulation of products
they themselves have marketed.83 As a matter of trademark law, trade-
mark owners are free to include restrictions on territory, customers, or
resale prices in their first sale agreement. But they can enforce such pro-
visions against noncomplying parties only through contractual remedies
and can sue third parties only under the tort theory of induced breach of
contract.84 The same rule applies to products marketed not by the owner
but with the owner's consent, i.e. , by licensees.
78 McCarthy, supra note 77, at 1112.
79 Leeds, Trademarks-Our American Concept, 46 TRADE-MARK REP. 1451, 1453 (1956).
80 See the explanatory memorandum of the Benelux Uniform Trademark Law under Article 11,
1962 BULL. BENELUX 2, at 36.
81 See Section 5 and Section 45 of the U.S. Lanhan Act 15 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982) and the com-
ments by J. GiLSON, supra note 34, at 6-9.
82 This has been so defined by Handler, supra note 19, at 388.
83 See the translation of Article 13 A in fine of the Benelux Uniform Trademark Law, quoted
supra note 30.
84 For a comparative law study of the tort theory of induced breach of contract in Germany,
France and Belgium, see R. KRASSER DER SCHUTZ VON PREIS-UND VERTRIEBSBINDUNGEN
GEGENUBER AUSSENSEITERN (1972); R. KRASSER, DER SCHUTZ VERTRAGLICHER RECHTE
GEGEN EINGRIFFE DRITTER (1971). The leading Belgian cases are: Cour de cassation of 24 No-
vember 1932, 1933 Pasicrisie 1 19 (exclusive dealing agreement); Cour de cassation of 17 June 1960,
1960 Journal des Tribunaux 627 (exclusive distributorship agreement and parallel imports); Cour de
cassation of 3 November 1961, 1962 Pasicrisie I 252 (exclusive distributorship agreement and paral-
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Trademark law complements competition law. Trademark licenses
are legitimate transactions. Restrictions that guarantee quality control
prevent the grant of a license from jeopardizing the function of the trade-
mark as a "guarantee of quality." Consequently, they do not constitute
Article 85(1) restraints of competition.
In both the United Kingdom and the United States, the imposition
upon licensors of a statutory duty to ensure adequate quality control
85
leads even more conclusively to the same results. Competition law can-
not conceivably prohibit those very provisions that trademark law re-
quires. United States courts have held that such provisions do not
violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.86 The courts have not, however,
specified whether the legality results from the Lanham Act requirement
or from a Rule of Reason analysis. A Rule of Reason explanation seems
most probable. The fact that restrictions aimed at quality control consti-
tute part of the licensor's statutory duty may not suffice to immunize
them from Section 1 of the Sherman Act. "[I]t can be argued that Con-
gress subordinated the Lanham Act to the antitrust laws" and that it
therefore provides no defense to antitrust charges.87 Whichever explana-
tion prevails, however, the conclusion is the same.
In the Campari case, the EC Commission recognized that Article
85(1) does not reach provisions that prescribe production standards or
stipulate the licensor's right to sample and inspect. The Commission rea-
soned that
control over the quality of the products manufactured under the license and
over their similarity with the original Italian product is. . . very important
for the licensor, in the sense that it is. . . bound up with its interest in the
maintenance of quality which is referable to the existence of the trademark
right.88
The conclusion is, of course, unassailable. As has been pointed out previ-
ously,89 however, the reference to the existence of the trademark right
inadequately supports it. The ancillary restraint of trade theory, explic-
itly adopted in an earlier case, 90 would have justified the solution
lel imports); Cour de cassation of 9 November 1973, 1974 Pasicrisie I 270 (price-cutting and resale
price maintenance).
85 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
86 See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 517 (2d Cir. 1964): "Nor do the antitrust laws
proscribe a trademark owner from establishing a chain of outlets uniform in appearance and
operation."
87 McCarthy, supra note 77, at 1115.
88 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 75; 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 397, 408 (1978).
89 See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
90 See Reuter v. BASF AG, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 254) 10, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. D 44
(1976).
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better. 91
b. Licensee's Obligation to Identify Its Products
To facilitate licensor monitoring of compliance with quality require-
ments at each level of distribution, licensing agreements frequently re-
quire each licensee to identify the products it has manufactured. If
licensors are not permitted to restrict their licensees' sales to a specified
area, identification at least provides the licensors with some means of
determining which licensee is responsible for which products. 92 Licens-
ing provisions based on such perfectly proper motives also lie beyond the
reach of Article 85(1).
c. Licensee's Obligation not to Disclose or to Use Secret Recipes
after the License Expiration
Certain agreements couple trademark licensing with transfer of
know-how. They then impose upon the licensee a duty not to disclose
the secrets to third parties or to use them after the expiration of the
license.
Secret recipe disclosure is designed to provide licensees with a
means of complying with manufacturing standards, i.e., with quality
control requirements. This aim justifies contractual agreements to pro-
tect the secret. The prohibition on use after the expiration or termination
of the license is similarly justified. The licensor divulges secret recipes
solely in order for the licensee to manufacture the products during the
agreement's operation.93
In the Campari case, the EC Commission implicitly adopted an an-
cillary restraint of trade test and upheld the obligation not to disclose. It
found that because such obligations are "essential if secret techniques or
recipes are to be passed on for use by other undertakings,"94 Article
91 The assessment of the obligation not to divulge secret recipes in the Campari decision itself is
actually an application of the "ancillary restraints of trade" theory. See infra text accompanying
notes 93-94.
92 In In re Coca-Cola, the FTC actually recommended the adoption of such a system as a less
restrictive way to control the quality of the products marketed by each licensee than the current
territorial sales restrictions. See supra text accompanying note 47.
93 The Commission seems, however, to object to such a restriction in transfers of know-how
connected with patent licensing agreement. See Kabelmetal-Luchaire, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L
999) 34, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. D 40 (1975) and article 3-10 of the proposal for a Commission
Regulation on the application of article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of patent licensing
agreements, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 58) 12, 15 (1979). Cf. the more flexible attitude taken by
the Commission with regard to the same restriction in its Notice on Subcontracting, 22 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 1) 2 (1979).
94 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 70) at 75; 22 Common Mkt. L.R. at 408.
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85(1) does not extend to them.
d. Licensee's Obligation to Buy Ingredients Embodying Trade Secrets
from the Licensor
This obligation has vital importance for some United States compa-
nies that own soft drink trademarks. It is a well-known fact that these
companies require that their independent bottlers buy syrups or concen-
trates from them only. They maintain a policy of selling those ingredi-
ents, rather than spelling out quality specifications, because specification
would entail divulging trade secrets of formulas. Some United States
lawyers believe this policy is relatively safe from tying charges under Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act95 and some courts have intimated the same
view by way of dicta.96 Nevertheless, surprising as it may be given the
large number of cases that address tying in franchise agreements, the
American courts have yet to decide the issue directly.
As compared with United States law, EEC law, at least at the Com-
mission's level, is more settled. In the Campari case, the Commission
acknowledged that Article 85(1) does not extend to the obligation to buy
secret ingredients, like coloring matter and herbal mixtures, from the li-
censor only. Because a trade secret protected knowledge of the ingredi-
ents needed to manufacture an identical end product, the exclusive
buying clause was the only way to ensure quality control.97 Again, the
ancillary restraints doctrine implicitly provided the decisive test.
Although this part of the Campari decision meets with approval, the
EC Commission should not, and probably will not, automatically accept
claims that an ingredient is secret.
e. Ban on Resale of Secret Ingredients
Licensing agreements also frequently couple the obligation to buy
secret ingredients from the licensor with a prohibition against reselling
those ingredients to third parties. Even those contracts that do not ex-
plicitly stipulate such a promise can be construed to imply it whenever
the licensee agrees that it will not use the secret ingredients other than to
manufacture the products covered by the license.
The reason for such a prohibition, however, is not altogether clear.
In this case, the quality control requirement does not offer a valid expla-
nation. Third parties who do not hold a trademark license are already
precluded from using the trademark for any products - including infer-
95 See J. GiLSON, supra note 34, at § 6-29.
96 See Siegel v. Chicken Delight Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971).
97 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) at 75, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 397.
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ior quality products which would jeopardize the trademark owner's
goodwill. Third parties who are licensees are subject to quality control
requirements under their agreement with the trademark owner. For
them, the ban on resale is superfluous.
A different consideration may be advanced in defense of such resale
restrictions: the need to prevent the secret ingredients from landing in
the hands of competitors who could either study them to figure out the
secret formula or who could use them to manufacture a competitive
product of equal quality which they could sell under another trademark.
That argument, however, fails also. Because the ban is not limited to
resales to persons outside the licensing system, it reaches further than
properly needed to achieve the suggested goal.
The suspicion thus arises that licensors ban resale of secret ingredi-
ents in order to buttress policies of charging different prices to different
licensees. If that is their true motivation, the EC Commission may well
challenge such restrictive convenants. In United Brands, the European
Court held that a price discrimination policy consisting of charging
whatever price each national market would bear violated the Article 86
prohibition against abusive exploitation of a dominant market position.98
In contrast, as long as they rely only on natural barriers to keep groups
of customers separate, non-dominant firms may lawfully implement such
a policy. In such cases, price discrimination is purely unilateral. Article
85, however, forbids restrictive covenants that maintain such a policy.
Actually, in a long line of cases starting with such cases as Grundig-Con-
sten 99 and Kodak '00 and continuing with the more recent Ford Werke
case, 1 ' the EC Commission has struck down both export prohibitions
and practices with like effect that are intended to enable manufacturers
to charge different prices in different Member States. That case law sug-
gests that bans on resale of secret ingredients are probably invalid.
This conclusion finds even stronger support in the Federacion Na-
98 See United Brands Co. v. Comm'n, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 207) 294-299, 21 Common
Mkt. L.P. 429, 498-501 (1978); Bishop, Price Discrimination under Article 86: Political Economy in
the European Court, 44 MOD. L. REV. 282-295 (1981); Zanon di Valgiurata, Price Discrimination
under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty: The United States Brands Case, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 36
(1982).
99 See EC Commission's decision, supra note 60, and the EC Court's judgment, supra note 61.
100 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) 24; 9 Common Mkt. L.R. D19 (1978); Joliet, Resale Price
Maintenance under EECAntitrust Law, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 589, 606-609 (1971).
101 See 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (no. L 327) 31, 39 Common Mkt. L.R. 596 (1984)appealfiled; Ford
Werke AG (interim measure) 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 256) 20, 35 Common Mkt. L.R. 267
(1982), vacated - C.J. Comm. E. Rec. -. See also Korah, Ford Werke AG: EC Commission's First
Decision Granting Interim Measures Prohibits a Unilateral Refusal to Supply Under Article 85, 1982
EUR. INTELLECTUAL PROD. REV. 290.
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cional de Cafetoeros de Colombia case where the Colombian coffee mo-
nopoly (FNC) set two restrictions in its standard contracts: first, that its
EEC distributors were to supply green coffee only to a number of ap-
proved coffee roasters who in turn were forbidden to resell and; second,
that directly supplied coffee roasters were to use in their own roasting
plants all the green coffee they bought.102 According to the EC Commis-
sion, the latter provision amounted to a ban on resale of green coffee to
which coffee roasters had agreed. That ban, together with the prohibi-
tion imposed on distributors from selling to non-approved roasters, im-
peded competition "in the market for Colombian green coffee sold by
FNC."' 3 Furthermore, the ban on resale of green coffee prevented cof-
fee roasters from making group purchases, i.e., from buying to supply
fellow plant owners as well as to cover their own requirements and thus
from taking fuller advantage of FNC's quantity discount system. The
EC Commission found that this could only exacerbate the ban on resale's
adverse effect on consumer selling prices." ° The EC Commission did
not explicitly state that the FNC designed its policy of segregating its
customers in order to back up price discrimination between buyers. This
was, however, probably the case. If the price differentials exceed differ-
ences in seller's cost of sale or of delivery that result from differing quan-
tities in which the commodities are sold or delivered, a system of
quantity discounts inevitably involves discriminatory treatment of
buyers.
Of course, there would not be a price discrimination in the economic
sense if the differences in the prices for secret ingredients charged to each
licensee reflected only differences in the services rendered by the licensees
to the licensor. In such cases, the ban on resale would, in my view, be
wholly justifiable. But the EC Commission is unlikely to share that point
of view. 10 5
If licensors wish to ban resales of secret ingredients in order to but-
tress their price discrimination schemes, their use of restrictive covenants
may often be unnecessary. Generally, the licensee to whom the licensor
102 Colombian Coffee, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 360) 31, 37 Common Mkt. L.R. 703, 704
(1982).
103 Id. at 34, 37 Common Mkt. L.R. at 704.
104 Id.
105 Compare A. Bullock & Co. v. Distillers Inc., 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 50) 16, 21 Common
Mkt. L.R. 400 (1978) with Distillers Co. v. Comm'n, 980 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 2229, 2282-2290, 29
Common Mkt. L.R. 121, 130-162 (Advocate General Warner's opinion). For comments in the Dis-
tillers decision, see Fuller, Price Variations-the Distillers Case and Article 85 EEC, - INT'L COMP.
L.Q. 128 (1979); Korah, Goodbye Red Label: Condemation of Dual Pricing by Distillers, 3 EUR. L.
REV. 62 (1978). The new Distillers decision announced by the EC Commission seems to reflect a
more flexible attitude, see 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 245) 1, 3 (1983).
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grants more favorable prices has no interest in reselling the ingredients to
less favored licensees who are competitors in the sale of the finished
product. In some instances, however, this may be different: if the fa-
vored licensee can make a higher profit on the resale of the secret ingredi-
ent than on the sale of the finished product.
f. Obligation to Buy Non-Secret Supplies from the Licensor or from
Designated Sources Only
In the Campari decision, the EC Commission objected to a provi-
sion obligating the licensees to buy non-secret supplies only from the li-
censor or its designated sources. 106 The Commission agreed to grant an
exemption only on the condition that the restriction be removed. The
decision merely reports that the Commission's earlier statement of objec-
tions addressed to the parties found the restriction in violation of Article
85. Because the decision fails to spell out the Commission's reasoning, it
does not shed light on either of the problems which those provisions
raise.
(1) The Goodwill Defense
The first problem is whether the trademark owner's desire to ensure
the uniformity and quality of the end product provides a valid defense.
The EC Commission apparently dismissed that argument.
In Campari, the less restrictive alternative of specification-which
allows the licensee to buy supplies anywhere so long as they meet quality
standards- was probably readily available. But, this may not always be
SO.
First, there are instances in which the same ingredient, though not a
trade secret, is absolutely necessary for maintaining uniformity of pro-
duction. Brewers, for example, say that they must utilize the same yeast
to produce a beer of the same taste. Secondly, if effective specifications
for a substitute must be extremely detailed, it may not be feasible for the
trademark owner to spell them out.10 7 Thirdly, the feasibility of the
specification alternative may depend on the number of licensees. The
costs of inspection may differ greatly. It is obviously a lot easier to check
production by a limited number of suppliers than to verify whether the
ingredients purchased individually by many different licensees comply
with the licensor's standards.108
106 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) at 70-71, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 397, 401-402 (1978).
107 See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States 293, 306 (1949).
108 See Susser v. Carvel Co., 332 F.2d 505, 520 (2d Cir. 1964), "that Carvel was able to specify
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In those three cases, the obligation to buy from the licensor or from
approved suppliers is the only way to ensure the uniformity and quality
of the finished product. Therefore, a justification based upon quality con-
trol considerations should immunize the restriction from Article 85(1).
(2) Nature and Effects of such an Obligation
Once the goodwill defense is rejected, a second problem arises: does
the obligation under review qualify as a tying arrangement or as an ex-
clusive buying clause?
Under United States law, that distinction is crucial for determining
an antitrust violation. Because tying arrangements involve the use of
economic power as leverage 09, they are subject to a much more stringent
test of legality. To be a violation, they need simply affect more than de
minimis amount of commerce in the market for the tied product.110 In
contrast, the legality of exclusive buying clauses depends on "the propor-
tionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of
commerce in the relevant market area" and on "the probable immediate
and future effects which preemption of that share of the market might
have on effective competition therein." '111 The Supreme Court's standard
of "sufficient economic power" in the tying product market does not im-
ply a need to show monopoly power or market dominance. 1 "[T]he
crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying product's desira-
bility to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes."' 3 According
to some commentators, exacting a tying arrangement may sufficiently
demonstrate such power.1 14 Not surprisingly, under those conditions
(the desired texture and taste of ice cream cones and sundaes) to its source of supply, whose product
it regularly checked, does not show that administration could be confided to 400 dealers."
109 See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
110 See Fortner Enters. Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969) where it is
said: "(N)ormally the controlling consideration is simply whether a total amount of business, sub-
stantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merelyde minimis, is foreclosed to competi-
tors by the tie .. "
111 See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961).
112 See Fortner Enters. Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-503 (1969).
113 Id. at 503; United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
114 See McCarthy, supra note 77, at 1104, referring to Fortner I, Fortner Enters. Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp., 395 U.S. 495 (1965). In Fortner I, United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters.,
429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977), Justice Stevens dissipated however the ambiguities surrounding the previ-
ous pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the area of tying arrangements and especially of the
opinion in Fortner L
"As the Court plainly stated in its prior opinion in this case, these decisions do not require that
the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the market for a tying
product... They do, however, focus attention on the question whether the seller has the
power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept
burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive market. In short, the
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both plaintiffs and judges have attempted to bring restrictions on supplies
in franchise agreements within the rule against tie-ins, rather than engag-
ing in the extensive market inquiry imposed for exclusive buying
clauses.' t5
In my view, the EEC institutions should not follow the United
States case law approach. First, the Article 85(1) does not reach tie-ins
as such, but only agreements between undertakings which "make the
conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to com-
mercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts."
In other words, it catches only agreements under which the parties
promise to engage in tie-ins in their relationship to third parties. In the
absence of such agreements, tie-ins are unilateral practices. They may
come within the purview of Article 86, provided that the firm is domi-
nant in the tying product market. As a counter-argument,some will re-
call that United States courts have applied Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
which also requires a concert of action. But the United States case law
amounts precisely to reading this requirement out of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
Second, even if this interpretation of Article 85(1) - which, no
doubt, will appear too literal to certain commentators- is rejected, there
is another objection to the approach taken by some United States courts.
It is highy questionable to infer from the ownership of a trademark
presenting certain distinctive features the kind of economic power which
makes it possible to impose on buyers a product they would not normally
buy. A trademark - and this is often forgotten - is just an exclusive
right to use a distinctive sign; it does not prevent third parties from man-
ufacturing competing products and from selling them under another
sign.
In my view, the restrictive provisions under discussion should be
question whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for
the tying product.
Thus it is doubtful that, by itself, the inclusion of tie-in clauses in contracts with 'any appreciable
number of buyers' establishes market power.
115 The leading case is Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir., 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972). This was an antitrust class action in which franchisees of Chicken Delight sought
treble damages for injuries resulting allegedly from illegal restraints imposed by Chicken Delight's
standard form franchise agreement which required that franchisees purchase certain essential cook-
ing equipment, food items, and trademark bearing packaging exclusively from Chicken Delight as a
condition of obtaining Chicken Delight's trademark license to operate home delivery and pick-up
food stores. Judge Merrill held that the arrangement involved distinct tying and tied products. As
to the proof of economic power, he merely stated that "it can hardly be denied that the Chicken
Delight trademark is distinctive; that it possesses goodwill and public acceptance unique to it and
not enjoyed by other fast food chains." Id. at 50.
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analysed as exclusive buying clauses. Article 85(1) applies only once
there is a factual showing of substantial foreclosure of markets for com-
peting manufacturers. 116 From my reading of the Campari decision, it
does not appear that the EC Commission concerned itself with satisfac-
tion of that requirement. My impression is that it will seldom be met.
Because all the United States cases involving franchise agreements were
brought by franchisees rather than by the franchisor's competing suppli-
ers, there was little evidence of anticompetitive effects. Competitive fac-
tors will influence the trademark owner's selection of the sources from
which licensees must obtain their supplies. As long as there is effective
competition at the level of the finished product, it is clearly in the licen-
sor's self-interest to require the cheapest but highest quality supply in
order not to put the licensees at a competitive disadantage in comparison
with competing trademark owners and their licensees.
B. Restrictions on Marketing the Products Covered by the License
1. Minimum Sales Quotas and Minimum Advertising
Licensing agreements frequently establish the licensor's right to ter-
minate the contract if the licensee fails to achieve a certain level of sales.
In addition, specific provisions often require that the licensee spend a
minimum amount on advertising the licensed product.
117
Neither provision, however, in any way impairs the licensee's com-
petitive efforts. Both should escape the prohibition of Article 85(1). In
fact, the EC Commission pointed out in its Campari decision that trade-
mark licensing agreements are a decentralized means of organizing pro-
duction and distribution: 18 in a given market the licensee takes over
from the licensor. Under such conditions, a licensor should be permitted
to compel licensees to maintain or increase the trademarked product's
market share. Regulation 1983/83 on exclusive distributorship agree-
ments gives parties complete freedom to decide whether they want to
include provisions designed to promote sales and their extent. 119 This
demonstrates that Article 85(1) does not apply to such obligations. The
fact that a licensing agreement stipulates minimum sales quotas and ad-
116 See Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin/Janssen, 1967 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 47, 7 Common Mkt.
L.R. 26 (1968); Joliet, La legalitd des clauses defiddlitd d'approvisionnement au regard de l'article 85
de Traitd de Rome, 22 REVUE CRITIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE BELGE 146, 161-162 (1968).
117 See Fisher, Foreign Licensing Checklist, 51 TRADE-MARK REP. 470, 475 (1961).
118 Campari, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69, 75-76, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 397, 410-411
(1978).
119 See the sixth recital of Regulation No. 1983/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983).
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vertising rather than an exclusive distributorship agreement should not
make a difference.
Nevertheless, the Campari case contains a puzzling remark about
the obligation to lie outside the scope of Article 85(1), because "there
[was] nothing to suggest that the amount of the sum in question would
prevent licensees from engaging in other activities or carrying on their
own advertising also."120 This seems to mean that if such an obligation
were either to interfere with the licensees' efforts to sell their own
branded products or to impede the licensees' own advertising of the li-
censed product, it would violate Article 85(1). The EC Commission's
first concern is perfectly understandable. Nevertheless, if licensees have
agreed not to manufacture or sell competing products, and if such a
promise not to compete is considered valid, 2 ' then the described effect of
interfering with competing products should not invalidate the obligation
to make minimum expenditures on advertising the licensed trademark.
The second concern is less relevant. Even if licensees were unable to
spend money beyond the stipulated minimum amount, the effect would
be anticompetitive only if a restraint of competition is defined so broadly
as to include absolutely any restriction on a party's freedom of trade. 122
2. Restrictions on Packaging and Advertising
Sometimes trademark licensing agreements specify the type and size
of containers licensees must use. Also, the agreements often subject all
the licensees' advertising materials and campaigns to the licensor's
approval. 123
Conceivably, national trademark laws could grant infringement
remedies against licensees who use packages or containers or launch ad-
vertising campaigns without the licensor's approval. The restrictions in
question would then not have to be stipulated within the agreement. But
this is not so.
In some cases, such as perfumes or beverages, the trademark can be
affixed only on the package or container; This operation undoubtedly
comes within the exclusive right of the trademark owner. 24 But the
120 Supra note 118, at 75, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. at 409.
121 On the test of validity of the non-competition clause, see infra text accompanying notes 208-
26.
122 See infra text accompanying notes 186-87 and note 186. See also Fisher, supra note 117, at
475.
123 See the suggestion by Fisher, supra note 117.
124 Article 15, § 1 of the German Trademark Law in the version of Jan. 2, 1968, as it was
amended in Apr. 1969, explicitly confers upon the trademark owner the exclusive right to affix the
trademark upon the package or the container.
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trademark owner who agrees generally that the licensee may affix the
trademark on a package or container cannot withhold such an agreement
because of a particular choice of package or container. The guarantee of
product quality is not jeopardized by the use of containers which the
trademark owner does not like.
Article 13A of the Benelux Law regards unauthorized use of trade-
marks in advertising as infringements."2 5 But like the German law 26,
the Benelux Law only encompasses the use of the trademark in advertis-
ing for products that do not originate with the trademark owner. It thus
does not enable trademark owners to rely on trademark protection to
dictate advertising policy to their own licensees. Again, the guarantee of
product quality is in no way at stake.
The licensor who wants to be able to oppose the use of certain con-
tainers or certain types of advertising must explicitly reserve this right in
the agreement. Such restrictions are contractual. They thus meet the
Article 85(1) requirement of an agreement.
The ancillary restraints of trade doctrine fails to validate the restric-
tions on advertising the trademarked product. True, United States
courts have held that restrictions on competitive style in franchise agree-
ments do not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'2 7 But those cases
relate to tradenames and service trademarks where the restrictions pur-
port to ensure the uniformity of the service offered. The quality control
requirement cannot justify restrictions on the nature and style of adver-
tising a product; they go beyond manufacturing the product, the only
proper domain of quality control. The same is true of restrictions regard-
ing the size and type of containers. But it does not follow that such
restrictions must be held anticompetitive under Article 85(1).
Advertising is designed to convey a certain image of the trademark
to the public. A licensor must be free to reserve the right to veto a style
of advertising and to object to advertising that is sexist, racist, obscene, in
bad taste or simply too different from the trademark's established adver-
tising style. Article 85(1) ought not apply to restrictions inspired by such
proper business considerations. In fact, a similar argument supports re-
125 See article 13A(l) of the Uniform Benelux Trademark Law; Deliege-Sequaris, supra note 38,
at 190.
126 According to article 15, § I of the German Trademark Law in the version of Jan. 2, 1968,
(amended Apr. 1969), the trademark owner is the only person entitled to use the trademark in
advertising. A dealer is not prohibited from advertising genuine products, i.e. products which have
been trademarked and marketed by the trademark owner himself. See BAUMBACH-HEFERMEHL, 2
WARENZEICHENRECHT, 585-86 (11 th ed. 1979). Hefermehl envisages only the case of a dealer or
distributor. But his remarks seem to apply to a licensee for a licensee is also selling genuine goods.
127 See supra note 86.
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strictions on the size and type of packages and containers. The use of
large rather than small bottles may influence whether the public per-
ceives of the product as being a luxury or an ordinary article. Again, the
trademark owner should remain free to choose an image and, to that end,
to restrict the use of certain containers.
3. Price Restrictions
Price restrictions do not require extensive discussion. In the United
States, horizontal or vertical price restrictions per se violate Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. In the Sealy case, the Supreme Court specifically
stated that "restraint. . . of the resale price of a trademarked article, not
otherwise permitted by law, cannot be defended as ancillary to a trade-
mark licensing system".
128
Although the EC Commission has not yet developed per se prohibi-
tions129, it has always found horizontal price-fixing agreements forbidden
by Article 85(1) - once the jurisdictional test of interstate commerce
was met. Moreover, the Commission has systematically refused to ex-
empt price restrictions under Article 85(3) because they by definition
cannot satisfy the requirement that utilizers receive a fair share of the
agreement's benefits. 130 The EC Commission approaches the field of ver-
tical price restrictions with similar severity. 13 1 If parties impose mini-
128 United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350, 356 n.3 (1967).
129 In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Ass'n, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1981), Justice Stevens has
excellently restated the meaning of the American per se rules as follows: "Once experience with a
particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will
condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable". The EC
Commission's tendency to consider as anticompetitive any restriction on the parties' freedom of
market behavior is no way similar to those conclusive presumptions of illegality. The EC Commis-
sion refers to a legalistic and mechanical test, not to experience.
130 See, e.g., Re VBBB/VBVB, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 54) 36, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. 344
(1982); GB-Inno-BM SA v. Federation Belgo-Luxembourgeoise Des Industries Du Tabac, 21 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 224) 29, 43, 23 Common Mkt. L.R. 529, 550 (1978); Comm'n v. Genuine
Vegetable Parchment Ass'n, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 54, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. 534 (1978);
Re the French/Taiwanese Mushroom Packers, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 29) 26, 29, 15 Common
Mkt. L.R. D83, D90 (1975); Re Groupement Des Fabricants De Papiers Peints De Belgique, 17 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 237) 3, 9, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. D102, D115 (1974); Re European Glass
Manufacturers, 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 160) 1, 15, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. D50, D74 (1974); Re
Cimbel, 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 303) 25, 38, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. D167, D188 (1972); Re
The Nederlandse Cement Handelmaatschappij NV, 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 22) 16, 24, 12
Common Mkt. L.R. D257, D273 (1972); Re The Vereeniging Van Cementhandelaren, COMM. EUR.
(No. L 13) 34, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. D16 (1971).
131 See Re Application of Gerofabriek NV, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) 8; 19 Common Mkt.
L.R. D35 (1976) in which the EC Commission has objected to purely intrastate resale price mainte-
nance systems. Previously, the EC Commission's position was that only resale price maintenance
systems across Member States borders were caught by article 85(1) as affecting interstate commerce.
See the Agfa-Gevaert statement of objections and settlement reported and analyzed by Joliet, supra
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mum resale prices on exclusive distributors, they are prevented from
claiming the benefit of the Regulation 1983/83 class exemption.
132
In the Campari case, the EC Commission explicitly found that the
licensing system did not contain any restriction on the licensees' sales
price. 13 3 It thereby intimated the decisive importance for granting an
exemption of the absence of such restraints. This position is entirely jus-
tified. Price restrictions are in no way necessary to safeguard the trade-
mark function as a guarantee of quality. 134 They serve no purpose other
than to stifle competition among the licensees or between the licensor
and its licensees.
4. Territorial and Exclusive Licensing
a. Basic Concepts
The debate over the application of antitrust law to trademark licens-
ing is nowhere more obscure than in the area of territorial and exclusive
licensing.135 This obscurity stems from a good deal of confusion about
the very nature of those arrangements. 136 In order to elucidate the com-
note 100, at 596-605. Clearly, price restrictions, contained in trademark licensing agreements con-
cluded by business firms located in different Member States, will even satisfy the less extensive juris-
dictional test spelled out in Agfa-Gevaert.
132 This is explicitely stated in the 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 2 (1983) (recital No. 8) and
stressed out in the EC Commission's notice on the new group exemption regulations in the field of
distribution, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 355) n.9 (1983). Previously, the EC Commission had
made clear that as a result of article 2, § 1 of Regulation 67/67, the presence of resale price mainte-
nance provisions precluded the benefit of the group exemption. See Comm'n v. Liebig, Ltd., 21 0.5.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 53) 20 24-25; 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 116 (1978).
133 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) at 71, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. at 403 (§ 30).
134 Compare J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 29, at 64.
135 The terminology used in the United States is far from uniform. For instance, in United States
v. Sealy 338 U.S. 350 (1967), the Supreme Court spoke of "exclusive territories," "exclusive territo-
rial licenses" and "territorial exclusivity" to characterize a restrictive scheme consisting of a system
of licenses which were territorial, exclusive, and coupled with territorial sales restrictions within the
meaning given to those terms in the present study. In its Coca-Cola decision, 1978 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) t 8855 (Supp. No. 30) (Apr. 25, 1978), the Federal Trade Commission probably meant
territorial sales restrictions when it referred to "territorial restrictions which prevent these independ-
ent bottlers from competing with one another." See also First Beverage Inc. of Las Vegas v. Royal
Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 1980). The Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act
of 1980, 15 U.S. Code §§ 3501-3503 (1982), uses the expressions "territorial provisions" and "exclu-
sive territories." While it does not define the former term, the act uses the latter term to cover
"provisions granting the licensee the sole and exclusive right to manufacture, distribute and sell such
product in a defined geographic area or limiting the licensee, directly or indirectly, to the manufac-
ture, distribution, and sale of such product only for ultimate resale to consumers within a defined
geographic area."
136 Cf J. GILSON, supra note 34, who distinguished exclusive licenses from non exclusive licenses,
§ 6.03(3), but failed to draw a distinction between licenses covering a specified area and territorial
sales restrictions § 6.03(4). See also Leblanc, Antitrust Ramifications of Trademark Licensing and
Franchising, 53 TRADE-MARK REP. 519, 537 (1963), who did not specify precisely the implication
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petition problems involved, it is necessary to distinguish three types of




A territorial license is a promise by the trademark owner not to sue
a particular business, the licensee, for use of the trademark in a specified
area. Such a promise may be a "domestic" territorial license or an "in-
ternational" territorial license. The first covers only part of a national
territory - such as part of France, Germany or the Benelux countries.
1 38
The second relates to just one foreign country when the licensor holds
independent rights in different countries for an identical trademark. In
fact, because licenses are always defined in connection with a territory,
they are in that sense inherently territorial. A license granted for the
whole of the domestic market does not cover foreign markets; a license
granted for one foreign country does not encompass other foreign
countries.
Systems of territorial licensing do not, as such, raise antitrust
problems. Even if a trademark owner makes concurrent promises to dif-
ferent firms for different areas or countries, there will still be no agree-
ment to divide territories among licensees. 139 The licensor does not agree
to protect licensees against invasions of their territories by neighboring
licensees; licensees do not agree not to sell to customers located outside
their designated territories. Nevertheless, it has been intimated that a
licensee who sells directly outside the allotted territory breaches the con-
tract."4° This view is mistaken. A territorial license, as defined above,
of the mere grant of an exclusive license for a limited territory. The author noticed the expression
"territorial sales restrictions" while reading Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assoc. Inc., 353 F. Supp.
1143, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
137 See infra text accompanying notes 138-66.
138 The Benelux Uniform Trademark Law contains provisions which are designed to merge the
three Benelux into a single and unified territory from the point of view of trademark law. See supra
note 7.
139 According to one view propounded by legal writers with regard to French and Belgian laws,
see Joliet,supra note 56, at 183-186, the licensor would, by virtue of the general law of contracts and
of the good faith principle, be under a duty to sue infringers, even in the absence of any explicit
provision in the agreement. Even if that view is well-founded, it does not, however, imply the licen-
sor's obligation to rely on trademark rights to shelter each licensee from incursions by neighboring
licensees. As we shall see, infra at text accompanying notes 142-44 and at text accompanying notes
154-56, infringement remedies are in most cases not available against licensees holding a license for
one territory when they sell directly into another area.
140 See the explanatory memorandum of the Benelux Uniform Trademark Law under Article 11,
1962 BULL. BENELUX 36-37; Demaret, supra note 7, at 539. The author must confess that he has
erroneously endorsed that view in Protection des marques non enregistrdes et garantie des droits ac-
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implies a promise by the licensor only. It would be inadmissible to infer
a promise by one party, the licensee, from a promise by another, the
licensor. The licensor who wants the licensee to stay out of other areas
should explicitly stipulate such a restriction within the agreement.
14 1
Nevertheless, the subsequent question arises about whether the li-
censor, or even each licensee, can protect each territory from invasions
by other licensees by bringing trademark infringement actions rather
than breach of contract actions. This question may be answered only
after distinguishing domestic territorial licenses from international terri-
torial licenses.
Article 11 of the Uniform Benelux Law does not confer trademark
protection upon domestic territorial licenses.142 In other words, a licen-
see whose license embraces only Belgium does not infringe the trademark
by selling directly into the Netherlands, even though the license does not
cover such use of the trademark. Given the Uniform Benelux Law, the
only way to confine each licensee within the part of the Benelux territory
to which the license applies is to impose territorial sales restrictions.
Of course other national laws may adopt a different rule. 143 In those
quis dans la loi Benelux: Un exemple pour la marque europdenne, 1976 REVUE DE DROIT INTEL-
LEcTUEL 65, 98.
141 See Parkway Backing Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 154 F. Supp. 823, 826 (E.D. Pa., 1957),
affid 255 F.2d 641, 645-647 (3d Cir. 1958). This case involved an action for breach of contract
brought by an exclusive licensee against an exclusive licensee for another territory who had sold
bread to a chainstore which operated stores in the plaintiff's territory. The contract between the
defendant and the licensor contained no restriction against bona fide sales to an independent vendor,
even though the defendant had knowledge that the vendee would resell the breach within the exclu-
sive territory of another licensee. Both the District Court and the Third Circuit refused to read such
a restriction into the contract.
142 See the text of Article 11 of the Benelux Uniform Trademark Law translatedsupra at note 51,
and the explanatory memorandum of the Benelux Uniform Trademark Law under Article 11, 1962
BULL. BENELUX 36-37; Demaret, supra note 7, at 539-540. The same rules seems also to apply
under the United States Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982). TheParkway case, 154 F. Supp. 823,
also involved an action for injunction for violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Both the
District Court and the Third Circuit dismissed the action, but on different grounds. The District
Court held that "(n)ot only was there no substantial evidence of confusion as to source of origin in
this case, but it is difficult to see how there could be any. The 'source of origin' of Hollywood bread
is National, which controls the mix, the formulas and the packaging. There is no question that the
bread which American Stores sells in Allentown is Hollywood bread, conforming in every respect to
the standards for ingredients and quality set up by National. There can be no source of origin of
Hollywood bread, within the meaning of the Act, other than National."
143 Article 13 of the French Trademark Law of 1964 stipulates that a license may relate only to
part of the national territory. It is doubtful, however, that the licensee who sells outside his alloted
territory can be sued for infringement. Such a action would not be a sale of products bearing a
counterfeited or fraudulently simulated trademark, which Article 422-34 of the Penal Code makes
into an offense. Article 13 is only intended to determine the legality of the territorial limitation. It
does not specify which remedies, for infringement or breach of contract, are available against a non-
complying licensee.
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cases domestic territorial licenses may raise questions similar to those of
international territorial licenses. 1" But there is a major difference. In
the domestic license situation, restrictions on the circulation of trade-
marked products are purely national measures which do not involve im-
ports or exports. 14 5 Consequently, the EEC rules on the free movement
of goods cannot curtail the scope of infringement remedies. Harmoniza-
tion of national laws, based upon Article 100 of the EEC Treaty, offers
the only means of eliminating these restrictions. 146
With regard to international territorial licenses, however, invading
licensees are arguably subject to infringement actions. The Benelux
trademark owner can sue the French licensee for selling directly into the
Benelux. Despite the clear genuineness of the imported goods, the prin-
ciple of exhaustion' 4 7 does not apply. Because the first sale takes place
outside the territory specified by the license, it occurs without the licen-
sor's consent.'4 8 In fact, the treatment of domestic territorial licenses by
Article 11 of the Benelux Law supports that view. The drafters of the
Benelux Law obviously thought that in the domestic context an explicit
statutory provision was needed to prevent licensors from relying on
144 See infra text accompanying notes 147-56.
145 See P. OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE E.E.C., 84-86 (1982).
146 See Article 7 of the proposal of a first Council directive to approximate the laws of the Mem-
ber States relating to trademarks, New Trademark System for the Community, 13 BULL. EUR.
COMM. Supp. (No. 5/80) 10 (1980), and the comments of the explanatory memorandum under the
similar provision of Article 21 of the proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community trade-
mark. Id. at 63-64.
147 This principle is spelled out by article 13(a) of the Uniform Benelux Trademark Law, supra
note 30.
148 See Demaret, supra note 7, 554.
The rule is probably different under the U.S. Lanham Act, and especially under section 42, that
bars entry to the United States of imported merchandise "which shall copy or simulate" the regis-
tered trademark of a domestic manufacturer or trader or of any manufacturer or trade located in a
foreign country. 15 U.S.C. § 1114, 1117 (1982).
The remedy provided by section 42 is not available where the products are genuine. See Fred
Gretsch v. Schoening, 238 F. 780, 781-782 (2d Cir., 1916) with regard to a provision introduced by
the 1905 Trademark Act - which was word for word identical to the present Section 42 of the
Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982).
The famous opinion of Justice Holmes in Bourgeois v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 691-692 (1922)
does hold that the unauthorized importation of genuine goods constitutes an infringement and can
be restrained on the basis of Section 42. See Bourgeois v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923). Wrongly
or rightly, Justice Holmes analyzed the facts as involving non-genuine goods. Holmes found that the
trademark did not truly indicate the origin of the goods for "[i]t is the trademark of the plaintiff only
in the United States and indicates in law, and, it is found, by public understanding, that the goods
come from the plaintiff although not made by it." Holmes stressed in a later case that this reason
controlled. See Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1923).
Because the test is the genuinenes of the imported goods, there should be no distinction between
direct imports and parallel imports. In both cases, the imported goods are genuine, because the
United States licensor has control over the quality of goods originating with the foreign licensee.
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trademark rights to repel direct sales by invading licensees. They implic-
itly recognized the availability of infringement remedies in the interna-
tional context.'
49
The availability of infringement remedies as a matter of national
trademark law does not, however, result in automatic market segregation
among licensees. Not having promised each licensee to repel direct sales
by others, the licensor is free either to sue or not sue. 150 Moreover, since
the trademark laws of EEC countries make the infringement remedies
available only to licensors, 15' one licensee cannot sue another invading
licensee for trademark infringement.
1 51
In fact, even if the use of trademark infringement remedies were
systematic, the market segregation effect could not be imputed to the
territorial licenses. 153 The market segregation stems not from an agree-
149 See Demaret, L'utilisation de la propridt6 industrielle comme come cartel clandestin, in RAP-
PORTS BELGES AU XI CONGRES DE L'ACADEMIE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 419, n.61
(1982).
150 Of course, if the general law of contracts imposes a duty upon the licensor to sue infringers,
see supra note 139, it would appear that the market segregation effect rests upon an agreement. But
ultimately in reality it would stem from the statutory definition of infringement. See infra note 152.
The protection of the specific object of the trademark does not imply the extension of the infringe-
ment concept to direct sales by a licensee outside the territory specified in the licence. See supra note
140 and 147. The obligation to sue infringers retains an effect, even if the licensor cannot invoke
trademark protection to repel such sales.
151 See article 1 D of the Benelux Uniform Trademark Law which entitled the licensee to join the
infringement proceedings brought by the licensor only to claim compensation for its own damage;
article 25 of the French trademark law of 1964; A. CHAVANNE & J. BURST, DROIT DE LA
PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE 470 (2d Ed. 1980); for the German law, see BAUMBACH-HEFERMEHL
supra note 125, at 438-39, remark 2 in the annex of § 8.
152 Under French and Belgian laws, the licensing agreement could confer power ("mandat")
upon the licensee to sue infringers in the name of and on behalf of the licensor, see A. CHAVANNE &
J. BuRsT,supra note 151, at 470; and for the patent law, Joliet,supra note 56, at 183. In such a case,
in light of the EC Court of Justice case law, it would certainly be proper to conclude that, although
an industrial property right as a legal entity does not include the contract element required by article
85(1), its exercise, i.e., the infringement action, falls within the ambit of article 85(1). Consequently,
this right may be restricted, because it has been "the subject, the means or the result of a restrictive
practice." See Sirena S.R.L. v. Eda S.R.L. 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 69, 82, 10 Common Mkt. L.R.
260, 273, (formula was used for the first time); and more recently Nungesser and K. Eisele v.
Comm'n 1982 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 2061, 36 Common Mkt. L.R. 278. But this case law is, in my
view, questionable. True the agreement gives the licensee the infringement remedy. Nevertheless,
the licensee's ability to repel direct exports by neighboring licensees ultimately relies on the statutory
definition of infringement. Consequently, the impediment to competition would stem from the stat-
ute, a state measure, and not from the agreement.
153 Conversely, territorial sales restrictions do not escape article 85(1) merely because these re-
strictions restate the protection inherent in national trademark laws. Trademark laws provide a
different type of remedy; licensor can sue the non-complying licensee for breach of contract, regard-
less of whether the invasion of another licensee's territory constitutes a trademark infringement.
Thus, even though domestic courts must disregard national statutes granting infringement remedies
against parallel imports of genuine goods because the statutes conflict with the rules on the free
movement of goods, contractual provisions designed to prevent such imports are challengeable under
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ment, but from an infringement action that is by hypothesis unilateral
and fostered by the territorial organization of trademark laws.
There is, however, no need to dwell upon that issue. In view of the
European Court case law, it is certain that when national trademark laws
grant infringement remedies against direct sales in one EEC country by a
licensee for another EEC country, they conflict with EEC rules on the
free movement of goods. In the Hag case, the European Court decided
that a German trademark owner's direct exports into Luxemburg, where
an unrelated company held the trademark rights, could not be barred on
the basis of the Uniform Benelux Trademark Law. t" 4 In that case the
imported goods did not originate with the same source identified by the
trademark in Luxemburg. Since the alleged German infringer and the
Luxemburg plaintiff did not represent affiliated companies and were not
linked by a distributorship or licensing agreement, there was no guaran-
tee of the uniformity or quality of the product. 55 Thefag doctrine ap-
plies a fortiori whenever the products are genuine for having been
manufactured by the trademark owner's licensee. 56 As a result, trade-
mark owners can no longer utilize infringement actions to implement a
policy of confining licensees within national borders. Such a policy must
rely instead on restrictive convenants, i.e., territorial sales restrictions.
(2) Exclusive Territorial Licenses
Licensors can go one step further than merely promising not to sue
the licensee for use of the trademark in a specified area. They may guar-
antee that the license will be exclusive. The exclusivity entails a promise
not to make the same territorial promise to anyone else, and thereby a
article 85(1). Compare the argument of the U.K. Government in theNungesser case with the answer
of the European Communities' Court of Justice; Nungesser and K. Eisele v. Comm'n, 1982 C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. at 2070, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. at 354.
154 Van Zuylen v. Hag, 1974 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 731, 743-745, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 127, 143.
155 This is precisely the reason thatHag case provoked such an outcry among legal commenta-
tors. See authorities cited supra note 14.
156 See, e.g., Demaret, supra note 148, at 520. Parallel imports are already free by virtue of the
principle of exhaustion. This principle applies as a result either of national law or Community law.
For a comparative study of national laws, see F.K. Beier, Territoriality of Trademark Law and Inter-
national Trade, I INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 48 (1970); on Benelux trademark law,
see Demaret, supra note 7, at 551-552 and the explanatory memorandum under article 13, 1962
BULL. BENELUX 36; on German law, see the Cinzano judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof of Feb. 2,
1973, 4 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 432 (1973) and the comment by F.K. Beier; on
British law, see the decision of the Court of Appeal (Civ. Div.) of Nov. 22, 1979 in the Revlon case,
I 1 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 378 (1980) and the comment by W. Cornish. The
Winthrop case of the European Communities' Court of Justice, Centrafarm v. Winthrop, 1974 C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 1183, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 480, clearly establishes that domestic courts must
disregard national statutes which grant infringement remedies against parallel imports of genuine
products, because the statutes conflict with the rules of the free movement of goods.
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commitment not to guarantee immunity to third parties for use of the
trademark in the same territory. The licensor retains the option of
resorting to available infringement remedies against such third parties.
The exclusivity does not, however, imply any agreement actively to pre-
vent other firms, for instance neighboring licensees, from using the trade-
mark in the allotted territory.
Thus, concurrent exclusive territorial licenses do not effectuate hori-
zontal market division among licensees any more than do concurrent
non-exclusive territorial licenses. 57 The preceding discussion of in-
fringement remedies' 58 applies to exclusive territorial licenses as well.
The term "exclusive license" is also used to refer to the licensor's
undertaking not personally to use the trademark in the territory allotted
to the licensee. To the extent that such an undertaking amounts to a
promise not to sell in the licensee's territory, the label of exclusive license
is misleading. The restriction is in fact a territorial sales restriction ac-
cepted by the licensor and is generally accompanied by a reciprocal
promise by the licensee not to invade the licensor's reserved territory.'
59
(3) Territorial Sales Restrictions
Rather than merely grant an exclusive license for one specified area,
a licensor may agree both personally not to use the trademark in the area
and to prevent each licensee from using the trademark in exclusive terri-
tories of other licensees, i.e. from selling directly in those territories.'
60
157 The United States enforcement agencies have never challenged exclusive territorial licenses,
and there is at least one case, Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assocs., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1147-1148
(N.D. Ill. 1972), which intimates that, unlike territorial sales restrictions, exclusive territorial
licenses do not raise any antitrust problems.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 142-156.
159 Cf. GILSON, supra at note 34, at § 6.03[3]-(4), suggesting that a licensor's promise to refrain
from suing the trademark in a particular area is, unlike territorial sales restrictions, immune from
antitrust attack. This was not the posture of the Federal Trade Commission in the Coca-Cola case,
91 F.T.C. 517 (1978). It is a well-known fact that, in the soft drink industry, some syrup manufac-
turers operate their own bottling facilities (directly or through subsidiaries) in some areas and, at the
same time, license independent bottlers in other areas. The Federal Trade Commission treated prop-
erly as territorial sales restrictions both the licensor's promise not to use the trademark in independ-
ent licensed bottlers' territories and those bottlers' undertaking not to sell outside their alloted
territories.
160 In the Nungesser case, 1982 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 2067, 36 Common Mkt. L.R. at 352, the
provision, which the EC Court construed as a promise not to grant a license to any other person for
the same territory, was drafted so that the provision could have implied the licensor's duty to protect
the licensee against direct sales by other licensees. The words "to refrain from having . . ." seem to
translate in German, "zu lassen ," poorly; the phrase "die Verpflichtung des INRA. . . das betref-
fende Saatgut in Deutschland weder erzeugen noch verkaufen zu lassen" can also mean "the obliga-
tion upon INRA. . . to refrain from letting the relevant seeds produced or sold in Germany." See
Axter, (1982) GRUR INT 646, 649.
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As we have seen, 16 1 licensors can no longer resort to infringement reme-
dies to keep each national licensee from invading national territories al-
lotted to other exclusive licensee. Thus, in order to carry out such a
promise to one licensee, the licensor must exact from the other licensees a
covenant not to export directly into the first licensee's territory.
In such cases, there is a market division between a licensor and its
licensees and between its licensees and it is traceable to a system of agree-
ments. The market division between the licensor and its licensees is espe-
cially obvious if the licensor, in return for promises not to compete with
the licensees in their territories, exact promises from licensees that they
will not sell in its reserved territory. But, as exemplified by the American
case law, such restrictive schemes should not be banned automatically.
In both Sealy and Topco, the United States Supreme Court categorized
territorial sales restrictions as horizontal agreements. 162 Consequently,
the Court held that they wereper se violations of Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. Factually, both cases involve a licensing corporation that was
owned and controlled by its licensees. If licensees have a relationship
with an independent licensing entity, however, then territorial sales re-
strictions generally qualify as vertical restraints. In those cases, they are
subject to review under the Sylvania 163 Rule of Reason approach.' 64. By
virtue of the Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act of 1980165, a less
stringent test controls the territorial restrictions used in agreements be-
tween syrup manufacturers and their independent bottlers.
166
161 Supra text accompanying notes 147-56.
162 United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350, 354 (1967), United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596,
608 (1972).
163 Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
164 See also the Federal Trade Commission's decision in the Coca-Cola case, 91 F.T.C. 517
(1978), First Beverages of Las Vegas v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164, 1168-1171 (9th Cir.
1980).
165 15 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982). The sponsors and proponents of the bill objected to the Federal
Trade Commission's decision in the Coca-Cola case, supra note 164, because the Commission did not
weigh properly the effects of the territorial sales restrictions on competition between the various
syrup manufacturers. See Hearings on S. 598 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and
Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (statement of E.
Gellhorn) [hereinafter cited asS. 598 Hearings].
166 While under the Sylvania rule, the benefits to interbrand competition must outweigh the
detriments to intrabrand competition, the 1980 Act disregards any effects on intrabrand competition
as long as interbrand competition remains effective and substantial. See S. 598 Hearings, at 143
(statement of R. Favretto); Abrams, Antitrust Law in the Soft Drink Industry, 26 ANTITRUST BULL.
697, 701 (1982). In a persuasive case study, Stem, Zelek and Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Analysis of
Territorial Restrictions in the Soft Drink Industry, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 481 (1982), applied the
model of Rule of Reason analysis the authors had outlined, see supra note 71, to the soft drink
industry. They concluded that territorial sales restrictions overall should be considered to be
anticompetitive.
EEC Trademark Licensing Agreements
5:755(1983)
b. Views of EEC Institutions
The EC Commission: The Campari Decision
In the Campari case, the EC Commission faced a system of interna-
tional exclusive territorial licenses supplemented by the licensor's prom-
ise not to compete in the licensees' territories and by bans on each
licensee's direct exports into other EEC countries.
167
The Commission held that both the exclusivity promise and the li-
censor's promise not to compete violated Article 85(1). It found that the
exclusivity promise limited competition by restricting the trademark
owner's freedom to license other firms for the alloted territory168 and
that the promise not to compete with the licensees equally violated Arti-
cle 85(1), because it deprived the trademark owner of "the competitive
advantage to be gained from manufacture by himself in (their territo-
ries)". 6 9 But, under Article 85(3), the Commission exempted both the
exclusivity and the licensor's promise not to compete under Article
85(3).
Undoubtedly the bans on exports effectuated a geographical market
division among licensees. The Commission made it clear that it could
not permit absolute bans on exports. 17' At the same time, however, it
accepted less absolute territorial sales restrictions, i.e. prohibitions on
each licensee and on the licensor from pursuing active sales policies
outside their reserved territories.17 1  Such restrictions are identical to
those exempted by Article 2 § 1 (b) of Regulation 1983/83 for exclusive
distributorship agreements.
172
It is not always easy to distinguish which of the exemption's justifi-
167 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 397 (1978).
168 Id. at 73, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. at 406.
169 Id. Actually, the promise not to use the trademark in the licensees' territories does not restrict
the trademark owner's freedom to manufacture because manufacturing alone does not involve a use
of the trademark but does restrict the trademark owner's freedom to sell in those areas.
170 Id. at 71, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. at 401 (§ 22).
171 Id. at 76, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 411 (§ 41). The EC Commission acted rather inconsistently.
On the one hand, the Commission exempted the licensor's promise not to use the trademark in the
licensees' territories, i.Le a promise not to sell into those territories. At the same time, however, the
Commission objected to the export prohibition to which the licensor agreed and compelled Campari
to the prohibition with a promise not to pursue an active sales policy outside the reserved territory!
172 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983), which has replaced the Regulation No. 67/67 of
Mar. 22, 1967, 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 57) 849 (1967). Such provisions are more restrictive than
areas of primary arrangements. For a definition of primary arrangements, see OPPENHEIM, WES-
TON AND MCCARTHY,supra note 16, at 612 which the United States Department of Justice seems to
accept more easily than strict territorial sales restrictions. See reproduced in HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, THE SOFT DRINK INTERBRAND COMPETITION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. - (1980) (letter from the Assistant Attorney General, A. Parker).
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cations apply to which restrictions.'7 3 The EC Commission reasoned
that the exclusivity and the licensor's promise not to compete "con-
fer(red) upon each licensee an advantage in its allotted territory" and
that "(t)his advantage (was) such as to permit a sufficient return on the
investment made by each licensee for the purpose of manufacturing the
product bearing the trademark. ... "' Thus, both restrictions contrib-
uted to improving production and distribution. The ban on active sales
policies outside the allotted territory would compel licensees to concen-
trate their sales efforts, but "without preventing buyers elsewhere in the
Community from securing supplies freely from any of the licensees."'
17 5
The Commission also explained, without referring to either of those re-
strictions specifically, that "none of the licensees and in all probability no
other undertaking would have been prepared to make the investment
necessary for a significant increase in sales of Bitter if it was not sure of
being protected from competition from other licensees or Campari-Mi-
lano itself."' 76 For that reason, the restrictions were indispensable for
achieving the above-mentioned benefits.
The European Court: The Nungesser Case
Since the Commission's decision for the major part favored them,
neither Campari nor the licensees had reason to challenge it. As a result,
the European Court of Justice never had the opportunity either to ap-
prove or disapprove of that Commission position on trademark licensing.
But, in the Nungesser case,' 7 7 the Court dealt with exclusive territorial
licenses and with territorial sales restrictions in relation to breeders'
rights. Although breeders' rights obviously perform functions different
than those of trademarks t78 , the views of the European Court of Justice
can apparently transfer to trademark licensing.17 9
173 The EC Commission did not bother to justify guaranteeing protection to the licensor in the
reserved territory. The arguments that support the licensees' protection obviously do not apply to
the licensor's protection.
174 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) at 75, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. at 410 (§ 68).
175 Id. at 76, 22 Common Mkts. L.R. at 411 (§ 73).
176 Id. 22 Common Mkt. L.R. at 412 (§ 77).
177 See authorities cited supra note 31; Axter, 1982 GRUR INT'L 646 (English version in 38 Bus.
LAW. 165 (1982)); Korah, Exclusive Licenses of Patent and Plant Breeders' Right Under EEC Law
After Maize Seed, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 699 (1983); Pietzke, 1982 GRUR INT'L 530 (English version
in 14 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 274 (1983)); Turner, 8 EUR. L. REv. 103 (1983);
Usher, 38 J. Bus. L. 506 (1982); Van Bael, (1983) C. DE D 176.
178 Like the patent system, see supra note 16, the breeders' protection is designed to provide an
incentive to invention and innovation. On the trademark function, see supra text accompanying
note 79.
179 A judge of the EC Court of Justice stressed that the scope of the Nungesser case is limited to
breeders' rights. See Everling, Zur neueren EuGH-Rechtsprechung zum Wettbewerbrecht, 17
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The Court drew a distinction between open and closed exclusive
licenses. In the first case,
the exclusivity of the license relates solely to the contractual relationship
between the owner of the right and the licensee, whereby the owner merely
undertakes not to grant other licenses in respect of the same territory and
not to compete himself with the licensee on that territory. On the other
hand, the second case involves an exclusive license or assignment with abso-
lute territorial protection, under which the parties to the contract propose,
as regards the products and the territory in question, to eliminate all com-
petition from third parties, such as parallel importers or licensees for other
territories.180
Holding that Article 85(1) does not automatically apply to open ex-
clusive licenses, the Court quashed the part of the Commission's decision
that regarded the exclusivity promise and the licensor's promise not to
compete as violative of Article 85(1). 181 The Court argued:
In fact, in case of a license of breeders' rights over hybrid seeds newly devel-
oped in one Member State, an undertaking established in another Member
State which was not certain that it would not encounter competition from
other licensees for the territory granted to it, or from the owner of the right
himself, might be deterred from accepting the risk of cultivating and mar-
keting that product, such a result would be damaging to the dissemination
of a new technology and would prejudice competition in the Community
between the new product and similar existing products. 182
In contrast, the Court decided that those who secure territorial pro-
tection against competition from parallel importers by stipulating con-
tractual provisions or by resorting to infringement remedies inherent in
the industrial property right itself violate Article 85(1).183 Furthermore,
because such actions go beyond what is indispensable to the improve-
ment of production or distribution or to the furtherance of technical pro-
EUROPARECHT 301, 310 (1982). True, the EC Court referred in § 58 of its judgment "to the specific
nature of the products in question" (but without explaining how "specific" these natures were) and
restricted its conclusion to "a case such as the present." Nevertheless, the argument invoked to find
open exclusive licenses beyond the reach of article 85(1) (i.e. the incentive to take the risk of invest-
ing capital into a new product) is also valid for trademark licensing. See infra note 192. The only
way to differentiate these licenses is to contrast technology with mere branded products. Such a
distinction, however, would have little justification.
180 1982 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 2015, 2068, 36 Common Mkt. L.R. 278, 352, (1983). The European
Communities Court analyzed the various arrangements at issue, see id. at 2058, 2066-67, 36 Com-
mon Mkt. L.R. at 345, 351, as licenses. This analysis is of dubious validity but it is outside the scope
of this study to discuss it. Suffice to say, the Court does not clearly recognize the basic difference
between the following agreements: granting one person the power to apply for protection on behalf
of another person, transferring the right to apply for such protection, assigning the breeder's right
once it has been obtained, licensing such a right and agreeing to an exclusive distributorship.
181 1982 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 2015, 36 Common Mkt. L.R. 278.
182 Id. at 2069, 36 Common Mkt. L.R. at 353.
183 Id. at 2070-71, 36 Common Mkt. L.R. at 347-48, 354.
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gress, they do not qualify for Article 85(3) exemption. 184 To that extent,
therefore, the Court upheld the Commission's decision.
c. A Critical Appraisal
(1) The Exclusivity Promise
The EC Commission's rigid stand on exclusive territorial licenses
stems from its adoption of a very formalistic approach for determining
whether a contractual provision restrains competition in violation of Ar-
ticle 85(1). Without any concrete analysis of the actual impact upon
competition at large, the EC Commission deems any restriction upon a
party's freedom of trade inherently anticompetitive. As early as the six-
ties and the commencement of EEC competition law enforcement, this
approach has been subject to severe criticism.'85 But such criticism has
had little influence on the EC Commission's attitude.'86 If the exclusiv-
ity itself restrains competition merely by preventing the trademark owner
from licensing any other business for the designated territory, the logical
remedy would be to impose a duty upon the trademark owner to license
any possible app.licant.' 87 But of course because such a remedy would
gravely interfere with the owner's basic freedom of choice, it is too unrea-
sonable to have ever been advocated, even by the EC Commission.
The Commission believes that the promise not to grant a license to a
third party for the same area gives each licensee some territorial protec-
tion.'88 This is not true. Properly defined, exclusive licenses impose no
duty upon the licensor to protect each license against competition from
neighboring licensees. Contrary to what the Commission suggested in
the Campari case, exclusive licenses do not bar licensees from manufac-
turing in others' exclusive territories. Moreover, the Commission seems
to imply that one needs a license to manufacture a trademarked product.
In fact, anyone who does not actually use the trademark to identify the
184 Id. at 2073-74, 36 Common Mkt. L.R. at 356.
185 See R. JOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW, 108, 191 (1966); Korah, The
Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity-The Need for a Rule of Reason, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 320,
358 (1981); Kon, Article 85 § 3: A Case for Application by National Courts, 19 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 541, 554-55 (1981), Schechter, The Rule of Reason in European Competition Law, 1982 LEGAL
ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 3.
186 But see Re Cement Makers Agreement, 12 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 122) 8, 8 Common Mkt.
L.R. D15 (1969); Re Societ6 Anonyme de Fabricants de conserves alimentaires, 14 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 13) 44, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. D 83 (1971).
187 See P. DEMARET, PATENTS, TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS AND EEC LAW, 113 (1978).
188 Campari, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) at 75, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. at 410. At that point,
however, the European Communities also addresses the licensor's promise not to compete; this
promise undoubtedly guarantees some territorial protection to the licensee. See supra text accompa-
nying note 174.
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product for sale is free to manufacture it. Therefore, although the licen-
see is perhaps inhibited as to the permitted area in which to sell the prod-
uct identified by the trademark, it remains free, as a matter of trademark
law, to manufacture the product anywhere.
Thus, the EC Commission has unnecessarily worried about the an-
ticompetitive effect of exclusive territorial licenses. On that issue, the
Nungesser judgment of the European Court should be welcomed for re-
flecting a more liberal approach. The Court's distinction between open
and closed exclusive licenses is awkwardly phrased. 189 Nevertheless, it
must be approved to the extent that it rebuffs the Commission's rigid
stand on promises not to grant a license to any third party for the same
territory.' 90 As early as 1964, a legal commentator in the United States
propounded a similar distinction with regard to trademark licenses. It
suggested differentiating
(1) appointment of exclusive licensees in specified territorial areas where the
only restrictions are upon the licensor and the sales of the licensee are not
restricted in any manner; and (2) exclusive licensee appointment wherein
additional restraints are imposed upon the licensees limiting the territorial
area within which they may sell the licensed product. 19'
The European Court found that exclusivity promises lie beyond the
scope of Article 85(1), whenever they are necessary to provide licensees
with an incentive to take the risk of investing capital. This is not the true
reason for the inapplicability of the Article 85(1) prohibition. In fact,
once exclusive licenses are properly defined, it is clear that they do not
afford protection against competition from neighboring licensees. Thus,
if such a protection is necessary to induce licensees to invest, exclusivity
promises alone would not do. The investment-incentive argument relates
more properly to territorial sales restrictions (including the licensor's
promise not to compete with the licensees). Exclusive licenses should not
be subject to the Article 85(1) prohibition, simply because they do not
189 The phrase "closed exclusive license" seems to suggest that the combination of exclusive terri-
torial licenses and territorial sales restrictions imposed upon other licensees must be considered to be
inseparable and be struck down in its entirety. This result would contradict the doctrine of partial
illegality that the EC Court adopted as early as 1966, see supra note 186, and applied in the Nun-
gesser case itself. See infra text accompanying notes 201-02.
190 In the 12TH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 45 (1983), the EC Commission tried to mini-
mize its defeat. The Commission presented the main holding of the Nungesser judgment as though
the Court confirmed the view that exclusive licenses may fall under Article 85(1).
191 LeBlanc, Antitrust Ramifications of Trademark Licensing and Franchising, 53 TRADE-MARK
REP. 519-537 (1963). LeBlanc's distinction, however, is ambiguous, inasmuch as he does not define
the implication of an exclusive license. If LeBlanc means "exclusive license" to include a licensor's
promise not to compete with the licensees in their territories, then his opinion on this issue is subject
to the same criticisms as those directed to the Nungesser judgment. See infra text accompanying
notes 189-92.
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restrict competition either between licensor and licensees or among
neighboring licensees. As a result, the inapplicability of Article 85(1)
should depend not on a case-by-case analysis, but on a generally applica-
ble rule.
(2) Territorial Sales Restrictions
The EC Commission was more consistent in its treatment of the
licensor's promise not to compete and of territorial sales restrictions im-
posed upon other licensees in the Campari case than the EC Court of
Justice was in the Nungesser case.
First, there is no good reason to hold that whereas the licensor's
promise not to compete may escape the prohibition of Article 85(1)192,
territorial sales restrictions upon other licensees may not.193 True, the
licensing agreement usually provides the trademark owner with a way of
penetrating a geographical market otherwise inaccessible. If another
business possesses trade connections or technical abilities that put it in a
better position to develop goodwill there, the trademark owner may
choose to license that business for that territory. Consequently, even in
the absence of any restriction, licensors cannot be expected to compete
actively with licensees in the licensed territories. Nevertheless, the licen-
sor's promise and the territorial sales restrictions exacted from other
licensees foreclose intrabrand competition in the same way. Both types
of restrictions raise the same problems with regard to the applicability of
Article 85(1).
Secondly, if one agrees that some protection against competition
may be necessary to induce capital investment 94 , it is wholly unjustified
192 See § 53 of the Nungesser judgment, 1982 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 2068, 36 Common Mkt.
L.R. at 352. Probably, the Court's conclusion results from its inappropriate application of the dis-
tinction between open and closed distributorship agreements, see, e.g., Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L.
Import SA, 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 949, 959, 11 (Common Mkt. L.R. 81, 96, to licensing agree-
ments.
An open exclusive distributorship is an arrangement whereby a manufacturer is committed to
supply only one dealer located in a given territory directly, while this dealer, as well as exclusive
distributors for other territories, remain free to resell outside their territories. Such an arrangement,
in a way implies an obligation by the manufacturer not to compete with the exclusive distributor.
Without the privilege of being the only distributor directly supplied by the manufacturer, a distribu-
tor would not have an exclusive position at all. Nevertheless EC Court does not seem to realize the
distinction-that a license can be exclusive, even if not accompanied by the licensor's promise not to
compete.
193 Sections 53 and 57 of the judgment seem to contradict each other. When discussing the in-
vestment incentive argument (in section 57), the EC Court refers to a need to protect against compe-
tition from other licensees as well. But there only appears to be a contradiction between these
sections. Probably-but erroneously-the European Communities Court believed that the exclusiv-
ity promise itself provides sufficient protection against competition from other licensees.
194 As the Campari case demonstrates, this argument also can justify territorial sales restrictions
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to distinguish, as the Nungesser judgment does, protecting licensees on
the one hand from the licensor and on the other hand from other licen-
sees. That distinction, which does not appear in the Campari case, sim-
ply does not make sense. For a firm that has obtained an exclusive
license for the Benelux countries and plans to build expensive manufac-
turing facilities there, it makes absolutely no difference whether competi-
tion comes from the British trademark owner or from the French
licensee.
The European Court of Justice's inconsistent reasoning has very se-
rious consequences. Whereas the Commission's Campari opinion ex-
pressed a readiness to exempt some restrictions on direct competition
from licensor and other licensees, the European Court's Nungesser judg-
ment held that territorial sales restrictions imposed upon licensees are
always anticompetitive. Moreover, the Court seemed to suggest that ter-
ritorial sales restrictions imposed upon other licensees can never be ex-
empted under Article 85(3).195 In that respect, therefore, the Court of
Justice's doctrine is far more stringent and far less consistent than that of
the Commission.
In my view - and this was the EC Commission's approach in the
Campari decision - territorial sales restrictions should not be con-
demned outright. If they serve the interest of interbrand competition by
helping a new entrant, who could not otherwise find investors to put up
the capital necessary to manufacture and market the product, they ought
to turn out to be legal. In EEC law, such a Rule of Reason analysis can
be conducted either at the Article 85(1) stage or at the Article 85(3)
stage. The choice depends on the definition of restraints of competition
under Article 85(1). If a restriction on intrabrand competition automati-
cally brings into play the section 1 prohibition, 9 6 the Commission
should consider the favorable effects on interbrand competition only as it
examines whether the agreement qualifies for section three exemption.
If, however, a restraint of competition is defined as a restraint of market
competition at large, as opposed to a mere limitation of intrabrand com-
petition, the section 1 stage of analysis already involves a Rule of Reason
in trademark licensing agreement. 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 397
(1978).
195 The only way to restrict the scope of the judgment is to assume that the unqualified condem-
nation of airtight territorial confinement applies only to provisions designed to bar parallel imports
and that the EC Court did not mean that territorial restrictions on direct sales by licensees could
never fulfill the article 85(3) requirements. A strong argument supporting that interpretation can be
made, because the facts of the case actually involved parallel imports only.
196 This was the approach adopted by the EC Court of Justice in Consten and Grundig v.
Comm'n, 1966 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 299, 342-43, 5 Common Mkt. L.R. 418, 472-73, and by the EC
Commission in the Campari case, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 397.
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approach.19 7 The second view has the advantage of freeing the Commis-
sion from issuing numerous decisions for cases where the restriction is
likely to be exempted under Article 85(3). The Commission could then
concentrate its time and energies on those cases where detrimental effects
on intrabrand competition are not outweighed by positive effects on in-
terbrand competition.
Some commentators suggest that it is inconsistent for the Commis-
sion to permit territorial sales restrictions under Article 85(3), at the
same time that the Court finds that national laws that grant infringement
actions against direct sales by a foreign licensee conflict with the rules on
the free movement of goods.19 8 In view of the nature of the problems,
however, this difference is perfectly understandable. In the case of na-
tional infringement actions, the problem is whether the availability of an
infringement remedy is necessary to safeguard the trademark function.
Since the imported products are genuine, the answer is clearly no. 99 In
contrast, in the case of territorial sales restrictions, the question is
whether contractual restrictions on intrabrand competition in fact pro-
mote interbrand competition. Some antitrust economists have advocated
an affirmative answer.2°°
(3) Partial Illegality
A finding of illegal territorial sales restrictions should not spread
illegality to the exclusive promise itself. Where a contract is only par-
tially illegal and where the illegal clause can be severed from the remain-
197 In the Nungesser case, the EC Court adopted this approach, holding that, when it is necessary
to provide the licensee with an incentive to invest, the promise by the licensor not to compete with
the licensee may escape the prohibition of article 85(1).
198 See Demaret, supra note 149.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 143-51 and note 148 on United States trademark law. See
also the explanatory memorandum under article 21 of the proposed Council regulation of the Com-
munity trademark, supra note 145.
200 Antitrust economists in the United States do not agree, however, on the validity of the capital
incentive argument. Compare Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Mo-
tor and its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1968) with S. 598 HEARING, supra note 163, at 63
(statement of V. Goldberg). Even if the capital incentive argument is valid, it will not always justify
territorial sales restrictions. The legality of such provisions will depend on a case-by-case analysis.
See Stern, Zelek, and Dunfee, supra note 164, at 509:
While this argument is relevant to some extent for an emerging industry or distribution system,
it has little support in the case of an established, ongoing situation, such as Coca-Cola's bottling
system, because real investment will continue whenever the prospective rate of return exceeds
the cost of additional capital.
While eager to obtain control over territorial sales restrictions under article 85(1), the EC Commis-
sion may agree too readily to grant these restrictions exemption under article 85(3) based on the
capital investment incentive argument.
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der of the contract, the remainder should remain enforceable.2"' In fact,
exclusive territorial promises and territorial sales restrictions (including
the licensor's promise not to compete with the licensees) are perfectly
severable. According to the opinion of one American judge in a case
outlawing territorial sales restrictions, "the judicial surgery did not cut
the heart out of the body of the license agreement. '20 2 Indeed, this is the
conception underlying the Nungesser judgment. Otherwise, the Euro-
pean Court would have been unable to quash the part of the Commis-
sion's decision that dealt with the exclusivity itself, and at the same time
uphold the part that outlawed territorial sales restrictions.
(4) Contractual Provisions and Infringement Remedies
In its ownNungesser decision, the Commission also struck down the
German license's use of the infringement remedy to repel imports into
Germany of products first sold in France by the French licensee.20 3 On
that issue, the Court has endorsed the Commission's decision. 204 The
positions of the Commission and the Court, however, are both highly
questionable.
Suppose that a licensing agreement contains only an exclusivity
promise, but that the licensor, or the licensee, brings infringement pro-
ceedings to keep out neighboring licensees. Clearly, the infringement ac-
tion is unilateral. The only way to bring it within the ambit of Article 85,
a provision aimed at restrictive agreements, is to hold that the combina-
tion of the exclusive license with the infringement action violates Article
85. In such a case, a provision which itself does not restrict competition
becomes unlawful when combined with the use of a statutory remedy. It
is impossible, however, to separate the exclusive licensing feature from
the restriction on sales; to do so would amount to forbidding a unilateral
action.205 This result conflicts with the principle of partial illegality ex-
201 For United States antitrust law, see Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assoc., 353 F. Supp. 1143,
1147 (N.D. Il. 1972); for EEC law, see Consten and Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 C.J. Comm. E. Rec.
299, 344, 5 Common Mkt. L.R. 418, 474; Soci& Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau, 1966 C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 235, 250, 5 Common Mkt. L.R. 357, 375.
202 Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assoc., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
203 Bomberault v. Eisele and Inra, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 286) 23, 23 Common Mkt. L.R.
434, 450, 458 (1978).
204 The EC Court analyzed the agreement at issue as a license. See supra note 179. However, the
Nungesser society could sue infringers only because it was the owner of the breeders' rights. Ac-
cording to the German law on breeder protection, it is dubious that a licensee, even an exclusive
licensee, might use statutory remedy. Cf the solution in patent law as described by Krasser &
Schmid, Der Lizenzvertrag tiber technische Schutzrechte aus der Sicht des deutchen Zivilrechts, 1982
GRUR INT 331.
205 See remarks by Joliet on the Beguelin case, Beguelin Import v. S.A.G.L. Import, 1971 C.J.
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pounded above.
In fact, the restriction on competition in such a situation stems not
from the agreement, but from the national law defining the scope of the
infringement remedy. It lies in legislative action, i.e. a state measure, as
opposed to collusive action by business firms. 20 6 The proper course of
action would have been for the Commission to challenge the German
breeders' rights statute under Article 169 for violating the rules on the
free movement of goods. Also, the importer could have raised the Ger-
man statute's incompatibility with Community law as a defense to the
infringement action.20 7 Use of Article 85 has merely confused competi-
tion law with the rules on the free movement of goods.
C. Restrictions on Manufacturing and Selling Competing Products-
The Exclusive Dealing Clause
1. The EC Commission's View
The Campari case shows that while exclusive dealing clauses in
trademark licensing agreements are caught as a matter of principle by
Article 85(1), they are likely to be exempted under Article 85(3). The
Comm. E. Rec. 949, 959-960, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 87, 96, in 8 REv. TRIM. DRT. EUR. 434-435
(1972).
206 Thus, it falls under the rules on the free movement of goods that are directed against such
measures. See Joliet, Patented Articles and the Free Movement of Goods within the EEC, 28 CUR-
RENT LEGAL PROBS. 15, 24-28 (1975) Ullrich, Intellectual Property in the EEC, in COMPETITION
LAW IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S.A., § 8, 20 (D.J. Gijlstra ed. 1977).
In the United States, one District Court similarly equated use of astatutory remedy (i.e. section
526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982) to prevent importation of genuine goods by
unauthorized middlemen with exclusionary behavior violative of section 2 of the Sherman Act 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See United States v. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). If § 526 could
be used to that end, an issue left to the unauthorized importer to litigate, it seems strange to prose-
cute private parties for taking advantage of the statute. Because the statute itself created the obstacle
to competition, as has been argued cogently by Dam, Trademarks, Price Discrimination and the
Bureau of Customs, 7 J.L. & ECON. 45 (1964), the proper remedy would be to amend the statute
which the United States Government has never managed to do. See W. FUGATE, 2 FOREIGN COM-
MERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 96-98 (3d ed. 1982).
Although the Guerlain case provides rather weak authority (the action was finally dismissed,
see FUGATE, supra, at 96), the case has left imprints on the Justice Department attitude. In DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 36 (1977), the De-
partment warned that it "would look with considerable suspicion upon the use of Section 526 to
exclude [imported products originating with affiliated or licensed foreign firms]". See J. ATWOOD &
K. BREWSTER, 2 ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD, 58-59 (2d ed. 1982) (critical
remarks).
207 Because article 30 has direct effects, according to the doctrine of primacy that the EC Court
has adopted in Costa v. Enel, 1964 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 585, 594-595, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425,
456, and Simmenthal II, 1978 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 629, 643-644, 23 Common Mkt. L.R. 263, 282-
83, the national court should have been under a duty to disregard the German statute and, thus, rule
in favor of the freedom of import.
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EC Commission held first that the Campari licensees' promise not to
manufacture and sell competing products, under a third party's license or
under their own brands, violated Article 85(1). The Commission based
its holding on the simplistic ground that such a promise eliminated the
Campari licensees as potential buyers or licensees of other brands.20 8
But, the Commission then proceeded to grant Article 85(3) exemption to
the licensees' promise. It found that because the restriction compelled
the licensees to concentrate their sales efforts on Campari and prevented
them "from neglecting Campari in the event of conflict between the pro-
motion of Campari sales and possible interest in another product ' 209, it
improved the distribution of the Campari products. This reasoning typi-
fies the EC Commission's formalistic approach for ascertaining whether
an agreement restricts competition within the meaning of Article
85(1).211 Quite clearly, if the exclusive dealing clause is necessary to pro-
mote competition with other brands, it does not restrain market competi-
tion at all. It falls beyond the ambit of Article 85(1). Article 85(3)
exemption is neither necessary nor appropriate.
2. The United States Case Law
As the recent Joyce Beverages of N Y v. Royal Crown Cola case
demonstrates2 "1, the Rule of Reason analysis of United States courts is
far more sophisticated. In that case, a Royal Crown Cola licensee for the
New York area planned to accept a license to manufacture and to sell a
competing cola product from another trademark licensor. When Royal
Crown threatened to terminate its license, the licensee filed a motion for
a preliminary injunction to restrain Royal Crown from terminating the
license to distribute its cola products. The licensee alleged that if an ex-
clusive dealing clause were read into the contract, it would violate anti-
trust law.
Judge Pollak held, however, that by accepting a license to manufac-
ture and sell a competing cola, the Royal Crown licensee breached its
obligation to devote its best efforts to handling and expanding Royal
Crown sales. The licensee was proposing to sell the new product to the
established customers of the old product and planning to use the adver-
tising and distribution methods developed in the promotion of the first
for the promotion of the second. The licensee would control pricing,
208 Compari, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69, 73, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 397, 406 (1978)
(section 53).
209 Id. at 75, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. at 410 (§ 71).
210 See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.
211 Joyce Beverages of N.Y. v. Royal Crown Cola, 555 F. Supp. 271 (1983).
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placement of local advertisements, special promotions, feature advertis-
ing and special displays of two competitive products. The licensee cer-
tainly would not be able to protect the interests of two competing
trademarks licensors evenhandedly.212 In the circumstances of the case,
Judge Pollak interpreted the best efforts clause to mean that best efforts
were exclusive efforts.
2 1 3
But, Judge Pollak denied that such an interpretation of the contract
violated antitrust law. "The crucial inquiry is whether the opportunities
for other competitors to enter or remain in the market has been signifi-
cantly limited. The test is whether the system of challenged exclusivity
arrangements in fact forecloses competition from a substantial mar-
ket." '214 The exclusive dealing clause "insures that the bottler devotes
undivided loyalty to its particular brand and that it competes vigorously
against all competing brands. '215 As long as the evidence does not show
that the competing licensor would be foreclosed from the market by rea-
son of its inability to find a suitable distributor in the area in question,
such practice does not constitute an antitrust violation. In the Royal
Crown case, there were viable alternative methods of distribution for the
competing product.2 1 6 There was not any antitrust violation.
The United States Federal Trade Commission's majority opinion in
In re Coca-Cola Co. also strongly differs from the EC Commission's view
that exclusive dealing clauses are anticompetitive. The majority opinion
suggests that it is not the exclusive dealing clauses that have adverse ef-
fects on competition, but the practice of "piggybacking," i.e. the produc-
tion and sale by a bottler of soft drink brands trademarked by two or
more syrup companies
[I]n the sale of finished soft drink products to retailers, piggybacking allows
a Coca-Cola bottler to control the pricing and marketing strategies for each
piggybacked brand. . . Thus he may determine unilaterally the extent to
which pricing policies respecting one of these brands will be permitted to
"cannibalize" sales of his other brands. . . Consequently, if a competing
bottler undercuts Coca-Cola and thereby cuts into Coca-Cola sales, the
Coca-Cola bottler's only defense may be a responsive price cut. In contrast,
if a Coca-Cola bottler who piggybacks Dr. Pepper finds that his price on a
Dr. Pepper promotion is cutting too deeply into his Coca-Cola sales, he
may find it in his interest to raise the price of Dr. Pepper rather than lower
the price of Coca-Cola. . . Thus, the Coca-Cola bottler in New York City,
having assessed the potential strength of Dr. Pepper in New York and hav-
212 Id. at 275.
2 13 Id. at 277.
214 Id. at 279.
215 Id. at 278.
216 Id.
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ing determined that its entry was imminent, became a Dr. Pepper 'pig-
gybacker'. . because: 'we would rather compete with ourselves than have
somebody else compete with us'.
217
According to the majority opinion, "the 'intensity' of interbrand compe-
tition cannot be realistically assessed simply by naming and counting
brands available in a market., 21 8 Indeed, "the fact that piggybacking
tends to increase the concentration of brands controlled by the strongest
bottlers in a territory" is far more significant.
219
3. Suggested Solution
To conclude, because a licensee cannot serve two masters in an ad-
verse relationship, 220 a Rule of Reason analysis should find that exclusive
dealing clauses in trademark licensing agreements are not anticompeti-
tive. It is "piggybacking" which has detrimental effects on interbrand
competition at the retail level.
But, as Commissioner Clanton stressed in his dissenting opinion in
the Coca-Cola decision,22 1 "piggybacking" may operate procompetitively
in exceptional circumstances. For example, in the case of high barriers
to entry due to the steep capital requirements of bottling, "piggybacking"
is the only means by which a new entrant can enter the market. Exclu-
sive dealing clauses ought to be struck down only in such special
circumstances.
D. Obligations Respecting the Protection or Policing of the
Trademark
1. The Non-Challenge Clause.
a. The EC Commission's Case Law Relating to Agreements Other
than Trademark Licenses.
A trademark can be subject to different challenges: opposition to its
registration, action for annulment or nullity raised by way of defense to
infringement proceedings, or action designed to obtain a decision on the
loss of the trademark. The promise not to challenge the trademark in
this way and on one of the grounds provided by national laws may ap-
pear in various arrangements. More specifically, in trademark licensing
agreements, the so-called non-challenge clause covers two types of under-
takings. First, licensees may recognize the validity of the trademark -
217 91 F.T.C. 517, 637 (1978).
218 Id. at 639.
219 Id.
220 555 F. Supp. 271, 277 (1983).
221 91 F.T.C. 517, 593-598 (1978).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:755(1983)
and thereby promise not to attack it on grounds such as the descriptive-
ness or the lack of distinctive character. Second, and this type of under-
taking is more frequent, licensees may recognize that their only rights to
the trademark are those granted by the agreement. By accepting that the
licensor is the owner of the trademark, the licensees surrender the possi-
bility of asserting a prior right to it.
Contrary to what certain writers have stated,22 the EC Commission
has not examined the legality of non-challenge clauses in trademark li-
censing agreements, but only in other kinds of arrangements.
First, the EC Commission has ruled223 against the validity of non-
challenge clauses that are intended to prevent one party from bringing
suit based upon the non-use of the trademark by the other party for peri-
ods of more than five years after the conclusion of the agreement.22 4
Such covenants, which appeared in so-called trademark delimitation
agreements, were designed to end a dispute between the parties over the
registration by one of them of the trademark. The policy underlying this
position is that "the object of the user requirement is to avoid overload-
ing the trademark register with unused prior marks in order to facilitate
the registration of new marks for new products and their entry into the
market." '25 The EC Commission found that private arrangements which
defeat that legislative purpose by preventing one party from applying for
the cancellation of an unused trademark conflict with an overriding pub-
lic interest22 6 and violate Article 85.
222 See Kinkeldey, supra note 73, at 146.
223 See Toltecs v. Dorset, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 379) 19, 39 Common Mkt. L.R. 412
(1983). See also Penney's, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 60) 19, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 100 (1978).
The Penneys decision did not deal with a true trademark delimitation agreement. It was a trade-
mark assignment, which was designed to give a single company the exclusive right to use the trade-
mark, "Penney's" throughout the EEC.
224 On the obligation to use the trademark, see e.g. Article 5(3) of the Uniform Benelux Trade-
mark Law, Article 11 of the French Trademark Law of 1964 and Article 11()-4 of the German
"Warenzeichengesetz" in the version of 2 January 1968. There is an essential difference between
those three legislations. According to the French and German laws, the uninterrupted period of
non-use must precede immediately the date on which a third party applies for cancellation ("extinc-
tion" or "Loschung"). By contrast, under the Benelux law, the applicant can invoke a non-use that
has lasted five years, regardless when the non-use occurred and of whether the trademark has been
used afterwards.
Assuming that the dates of registration and of the non-challenge covenant coincide, the EC
Commission's position invalidates any kind of agreement restricting an application for cancellation
on ground of non-use. The only non-challenge covenants which may be upheld are those which
concern older registrations. The policy reason underlying this difference in treatment does not ap-
pear clear, to say the least.
225 Toltecs-Dorcet, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 379) 26, 39 Common Mkt. L.R. 412 (1982).
226 Id. However, because only private parties bring suits for the cancellation of an unused trade-
mark, it is questionable whether a public interest is at stake.
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There is no need to discuss whether this stand is correct or not.
This line of decisions is not revealing as to the position the EC Commis-
sion would take with regard to non-challenge clauses if they are in trade-
mark licensing agreements. A licensor is not likely to be confronted with
the particular threat against which parties in those cases seek to protect
themselves: loss of the trademark because of non-use. In practice, a
business would have no interest in becoming a licensee for a trademark
which is unexploited and therefore unknown. On the other hand, once a
licensing agreement has been concluded, the licensee is under a duty to
use the trademark and that use of it enables the trademark owner to meet
the statutory requirement.
Second, the EC Commission has found that provisions in patent li-
censing agreements which require licensees to recognize certain words as
valid trademarks violate Article 85.
In relinquishing by contract the possibility of bringing (the descriptiveness)
into play, the licensee renounced the opportunity of using names or symbols
that might indicate generally, and without reference to a specific undertak-
ing, a particular sport in a striking way to a broad public. Such a possibility
might have represented an important element in their competitive beha-
viour, particularly in advertising. Conversely, the licensor could gain an
unjustified competitive advantage if it succeeded in monopolizing the use of
any such name or symbol for itself. The obligation of the licensees not to
challenge the trademarks was advantageous in this context. . . [T]he con-
clusion of a licensing agreement concerning patents only must not be used
in order to induce the patent licensee to acknowledge the validity of trade-
marks belonging to the licensor or third parties and thus to deny him the
opportunity of clarifying whether use of the relevant marks is open to all
competitors.
227
But the EC Commission explicitly left undecided "whether a non-
challenge clause with regard to a trademark also violated Article 85(1)
when it is part of an agreement concerning the licensing of this very
trademark."22
b. Suggested Solution
In my view, the EC Commission should not consider promises not
to challenge the licensed trademark as infringements of Article 85.
Generally, the utility of a licensee's promise not to challenge the
validity of the trademark on grounds of descriptiveness is doubtful.
Licensees are not likely to take such a step anyway. A business has no
interest in becoming a licensee for a trademark which could be proved to
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be generic. Moreover, once the licensee has entered into a license agree-
ment, it would be contrary to its self-interest to assert that the licensed
trademark is generic. Having invested large sums in manufacturing and
marketing the trademarked products, the licensee would lose the value of
those investments once others could freely use the trademark. Thus,
such a restrictive provision merely deprives licensees of a right which
they are not likely to exercise anyway.
That situation, however, differs somewhat from attacks on the own-
ership of the trademark. In fact, a licensee may well have an interest in
asserting a prior right against the licensor. But, a potential licensee with
a claim to a prior right in the use of the trademark should not enter into
a licensing agreement in the first place. EEC competition law should not
come to the rescue if a licensee later realizes such a mistake. There is no
policy reason to support promotion of a licensee's interest rather the li-
censor's. The trademark's use will be monopolized - regardless of
whether it is the property of the licensee or of the licensor.
If the EC Commission's case law were to evolve in another direc-
tion, it would contrast markedly with United States law. An agreement
whereby one party recognizes either another party's ownership of a
trademark or the general validity of that trademark estops that first party
from claiming rights to ownership or from contesting the trademark's
validity. United States courts enforce such agreements and uphold the
contract principle that contracting parties may not repudiate their
promises solely because they later become dissatisfied with their bar-
gains.229 Although in Lear v. Adkins, United States courts found this
principle to conflict with the patent policy-that ideas in general circula-
tion should be available for the public good unless protected by a valid
patent2 30 - they have distinguished trademark law principles from those
of patent law.
[T]he public interest in guarding against the depletion of the general vocab-
ulary available for the description of articles in commerce is not so great
that it should take precedence over the rule of the law of contracts that a
person should be held to his undertakings.23'
Even in the absence of any contractual provision in the contract, how-
ever, a licensee is considered estopped from claiming ownership in the
trademark or from contesting its validity by virtue of the licensing agree-
ment itself.232 Apparently no one has yet thought to apply antitrust law
229 Beer Nuts Inc. v. King Nut Co., 477 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir. 1973).
230 Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 394 U.S. 753 (1968).
231 Beer Nuts Inc. v. King Nut Co., 477 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1973).
232 See Prichard Co. v. Consumer Brewing Co., Donald F. Duncan Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co.,
343 F.2d 655, 657 (1965); Smith v. Dental Prod. Co., 140 F.2d 140, 148 (7th Cir., 1944), cert.
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to overturn those principles.
The EC Commission would be well-advised to follow the United
States example.
2. Prohibitions on License Assignments
Under the Belgian and French laws of contracts, patent licenses are
granted in consideration of the licensee's personal qualities, for example,
financial assets, technical ability, manufacturing facilities, trade connec-
tions and marketing skill. Thus, patent licenses are personal in nature
and, unless an express permission is stipulated, are not transferable. 33
Even if there is no case to support that proposition, the same rule un-
doubtedly applies to trademark licensing agreements. If the licensee is
prohibited from assigning the license when the contract does not spell it
out, it would be absurd to declare an assignment prohibition anticompeti-
tive when expressly stipulated. In fact, because such prohibitions would
not be severable, a finding that they are anticompetitive would result in
invalidating the license agreement itself, despite the fact that the license
agreement as such is a perfectly legitimate transaction. Therefore, an
assignment prohibition is, in my view, beyond the reach of Article 85(1).
Although the Commission reached the same the conclusion in the
Campari decision, it did not base it on a statutory duty theory. It rea-
soned only that "by banning assignments, the licensor is simply safe-
guarding its freedom to select its licensees. When it enters into an
agreement the identity of the other party is highly material to it and it
must remain free to decide with whom it will deal."
'2 34
Often, however, the agreement goes one step further than spelling
out a prohibition on assignment. The licensor may also reserve the right
to terminate the agreement if the licensed corporate entity passes into the
control of a third company with which the licensor prefers not to do
business, because, for instance, it is one of its competitors.235 As there is
no license assignment in the legal sense in such cases, it may be necessary
under the Belgian and French law of contracts to provide expressly for
such a right. Such a provision, therefore, cannot be justified by the statu-
tory duty analogy. Nevertheless, those provisions should certainly be
denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1944); Medd v. Boyd Wagner Inc., 132 F. Supp. 399, 405 (ND. Ohio, 1955);
GILSON, supra note 34 at § 6.03(8).
233 See Joliet, supra note 56, at 197-198 and the references cited.
234 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69, 75; 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 397, 409 (1978) (section 65).
235 In Superior Bedding v. Serta Assocs., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1149-1150 (N.D. Ill. 1972), the court
construed a provision prohibiting assignment of the license, directly or "otherwise", as embracing
indirect assignment through transfer of ownership of a majority of a licensee's stock. The court held
a new non-assignment provision that explicitly prohibited indirect assignment to be reasonable.
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considered as outside the scope of Article 85(1). They merely supple-
ment the assignment prohibition in order to prevent a result which, from
an economic point of view, can hardly be distinguished from an assign-
ment in the technical sense. It has been stressed that to allow a licensee
to control marketing and pricing policies of two competing trademark
licensors would be contrary to the basic requirements of competition.236
If one producer, by taking over another company, were to become the
licensee of another producer, the anticompetitive effects would be even
worse.
3. The Licensor's Obligations to Sue Infringers and the Licensee's
Obligation to Inform the Licensor of Trademark
Infringements
Under the Uniform Benelux Trademark law, licensees are not em-
powered to bring actions for infringement of their licensed trademarks.
They may only join the proceedings brought by the licensor in order to
claim compensation for their own damages.
2 37
Of course, the licensor will almost always have a self-interest in as-
serting the trademark protection against infringers. Nevertheless, the
question arises whether a good faith principle of the law of contracts
binds a licensor to sue, even in the absence of any explicit provision in the
agreement. An affirmative answer has been advocated with regard to
patent licenses under the French and Belgian laws.238 In my view, the
same answer should extend to trademark licenses. If the law imposes
such a duty upon the licensor, however, it should impose a correspond-
ing duty on the licensee. The licensee should be obligated to inform the
licensor of potential trademark infringements and to assist in the in-
fringement proceedings.
Again, if one assumes that the licensor's duty to sue infringers de-
rives from the general law of contracts, then invalidating an explicit
promise to the same effect amounts in fact to a challenge to the licensing
agreement itself. The reasoning is the same as in the case of the prohibi-
tion on assignment. Such a restriction does not restrict market competi-
tion anyway. A problem arises only because of the Commission's
mechanical tendency to treat any restriction on either party's freedom of
conduct as anticompetitive.239
A troublesome problem arises, however, from the fact that certain
236 See supra text accompanying note 217.
237 See supra note 151.
238 See Joliet, supra note 56, at 183-186.
239 See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
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national laws erroneously extend the concept of infringement to a licen-
see's direct sales outside the territory specified in the license. In view of
that position, territorial licenses - and all licenses are territorial - are
arguably coupled with a licensor's promise to resort to its trademark
rights to protect each licensee from direct competition by neighboring
licensees. But this is not actually the case.
As we have seen, licensees who hold a license for only part of the
Benelux territory are not infringers if they sell directly into another part
of that territory. 40 By contrast, national trademark laws may grant in-
fringement remedies against foreign licensees who export directly into
the domestic market.24' To that extent, however, the EEC rules on the
free movement of goods preclude their applicability, at least with regard
to trade between EEC countries themselves.242 Infringement remedies
are not available in that situation either. In most cases, the obligation to
sue infringers is thus limited to persons who sell true counterfeits, and
does not carry a duty to bring infringement proceedings against invading
licensees who sell genuine goods.2 43
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Of the many restrictive clauses reviewed in this study that are com-
mon to trademark licensing, very few raise serious antitrust problems. I
would cite only price restrictions, tying-like practices, prohibitions on the
resale of secret ingredients and territorial sales restrictions. But those
practices are not all equally objectionable. The traditional view is that
price restrictions are inherently anticompetitive. The obligation to buy
non-secret supplies from the licensor or from its designated sources only
would run a smaller risk of antitrust condemnation if it were analyzed, as
I believe it should be, as a requirements contract rather than as a tie-in
arrangement. 2" Too little is known yet about the purpose of a ban on
the resale of secret ingredients to justify a strict presumption of illegality.
Finally, the case of territorial sales restrictions, which is certainly the
most difficult, remains.
Whether intrabrand and interbrand competitive effects of territorial
sales restrictions are subject to Rule of Reason balancing at the Article
240 See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
242 See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
243 See article 2 § 1-6 of the Proposal for a Commission Regulation on the application of Article
85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of patent licensing agreements, 1979 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
C 58) and, 12, according to which "the obligation to take legal action against an infringer" does not
preclude the benefit of the group exemption granted by article 1.
244 See supra text accompanying notes 109-16.
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85(1) stage or at the Article 85(3) stage, 245 they may be judged only on a
case-by-case basis. Whereas certain justifications, such as the capital in-
vestment-incentive, may legitimize territorial sales restrictions in one
economic setting, they will clearly not do so in a different economic set-
ting. Passage of block exemption regulation by the Commission pursu-
ant to Regulation 19/65246 would not be a proper tool. Block
exemptions should be designed to insure greater legal predictability.2 4 7
Predictability, however, is only feasible if the block exemption is granted
by using mechanical tests requiring no extensive factual analysis. But, it
is precisely in passing judgment on territorial sales restrictions that ex-
tensive market analysis on a case-by-case basis seems to be unavoidable.
The procedures for making formal decisions are cumbersome and
take considerable time. The Commission must reduce this administrative
burden. At the same time, it must create greater legal predictability and
retain enough flexibility to be able to take into account the pecularities of
individual cases. The only way to achieve those goals is to issue a general
notice that would provide the business community with guidelines for
drafting their trademark licensing agreements in order to avoid antitrust
pitfalls.24 8 Such a general notice should include three parts. First, it
should contain a checklist of those provisions which clearly lie outside
the scope of Article 85(1): product specification, manufacturing stan-
dards, obligation neither to disclose secret recipes nor to use them after
the license expiration, obligation to buy secret ingredients, minimum
sales quotas and minimum advertising, restrictions on types of packaging
and advertising, territorial and exclusive licenses, non-challenge clauses,
assignment and sublicensing prohibitions, and promises to sue infringers.
Secondly, it should enumerate the restrictions which are devoid of any
redeeming virtue and therefore deserve an outright condemnation -
such as price restrictions. Thirdly the general notice should outline the
245 See supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
246 Council Regulation of Mar. 2, 1965 on the application of Article 85(3) to certain categories of
agreement and concerted practices, 1965 J.O. COMM. EUR. 533, empowers the EC Commission to
grant a group exemption to certain categories of bilateral agreements containing restrictions in rela-
tion to the use of industrial property rights, and especially trademarks.
247 On the need for greater legal predictability which, for instance, Regulation No. 67/67 on
exclusive distributorship agreements was designed to fulfil, see the EC Court's remarks in De Norre
v. Brouwerij Concordia, 1977 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 65, 94-95, 19 Common Mkt. L.R. 378, 404-05.
248 The European Communities Commission has already issued several notices of that kind. See
the Notices on Exclusive Agency Contracts Made with Commercial Agents, 1962 J.O. COMM. EUR.
2921; on Patent Licenses, 1962 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2922 (the so-called "Christmas message"); on
Cooperation, 1968 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 75) 3; on Minor Agreements, 1977 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 313) 3; on Subcontracting, 1979 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 1) 2. On the binding effect of such
notices, see R. JOLIET, LE DROIT INSTITUTIONNEL DES COMMUNAUTtS EUROtENNE: LES INSTI-
TUTIONS, Las SOURCES, LES RAPPORTS ENTRE ORDRES JURIDIQUES, 186-189 (1983).
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factual conditions under which some restrictions-such as the obligation
to buy non-secret ingredients from the licensor, exclusive dealing ar-
rangements or territorial sales restriction-should escape Article 85(1),
because they either lack pernicious effects on market competition or pos-
sess overall procompetitive virtues.
This approach would of course require the EC Commission to aban-
don its present practice and to apply a Rule of Reason under Article
85(1). But competition policy would have everything to gain. It is a
futile enterprise to subject to the Article 85(3) exemption scheme all
agreements which contain any restrictive provisions, but which will ulti-
mately turn out to be procompetitive. The Commission's limited re-
sources would be put to better use if they were utilized to uncover
agreements with clearly detrimental effects on competition and to prose-
cute the participating firms. Those agreements should be the main target
of a meaningful competition policy. But will the EC bureaucrats ever
learn the lesson from experience?
